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THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: INFORMATION
DISCLOSURE, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,
AND STATUTORY LAW ENFORCEMENT
EXEMPTIONS
Erin Murphy*
When criminal justice scholars think of privacy, they think of the Fourth
Amendment. But lately its domain has become far less absolute. The Unit-
ed States Code currently contains over twenty separate statutes that
restrict both the acquisition and release of covered information. Largely
enacted in the latter part of the twentieth century, these statutes address
matters vital to modern existence. They control police access to driver's li-
censes, educational records, health histories, telephone calls, email
messages, and even video rentals. They conform to no common template,
but rather enlist a variety of procedural tools to serve as safeguards-
ranging from warrants and court orders to subpoenas and demand letters.
But across this remarkable diversity, there is one feature that all these
statutes share in common: each contains a provision exempting law en-
forcementfrom its general terms.
Despite the appearance of law enforcement exemptions in every generally
applicable privacy statute on the federal books, they have garnered virtu-
ally no scholarly attention. Privacy scholars have primarily busied
themselves with mainstream consumer interests, while criminal justice
scholars have chiefly focused on the Fourth Amendment. As a result, these
exemptions have gone largely unexamined even as scholars and courts in-
creasingly look to statutory resolutions of Fourth Amendment questions.
For example, at least four Supreme Court justices recently suggested in
United States v. Jones that the proper scope of some privacy protection
might be a topic better left to legislatures than courts.
In response to these concerns, this Article examines, comprehensively and
in depth, the operation of privacy statutes with specific regard to law en-
forcement. In its most elemental form, this Article answers the following
questions: what does the federal statutory approach to regulating privacy
from the police look like, and in what ways does it mimic, overlap with, or
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Thanks are due to the Cen-
ter on the Administration of Criminal Law at N.Y.U. Law School, which provided support for
this project, as well as the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund. I am
also grateful to the N.YU. faculty workshop, the University of Chicago Public Law workshop,
and the Emory faculty workshop for the opportunity to discuss these ideas. Wonderful re-
search assistance was provided by N.Y.U. reference librarian Annmarie Zell, as well as
students Daniel Friedman, Kathiana Aurelien, Laura Arandes, Meghan Loisel, Nathan Ru-
benson, and most especially Jess Heyman. Dan Richman, Stephen Schulhofer, David
Sklansky, Orin Kerr, Peter Swire, and David Garland indulged me with helpful conversations
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differ from the Fourth Amendment constitutional approach? In answering
these questions, this Article also engages the deeper democratic debate
over constitutional versus statutory approaches to controlling the police,
using the lessons garnered from examining existing privacy regulations to
better inform the secondary argument about who does it best.
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INTRODUCTION
When we think of privacy protection in the criminal justice system, we
think of the Fourth Amendment.! But lately its domain has become less ab-
1. See, e.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 337
(3d ed. 2011) (describing the Fourth Amendment as "the law's chief source of privacy protec-
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solute. The United States Code currently contains over twenty separate stat-
utes that restrict both the acquisition and release of covered information. 2 As
might be expected, these statutes were largely enacted in the last third of the
twentieth century, and they address matters vital to modem existence-
including driver's licenses, education records, health histories, telephone
calls, email messages, and even video rentals. They conform to no common
template, but rather enlist a variety of procedural tools to serve as safe-
guards-ranging from warrants and court orders to subpoenas and demand
letters. Yet across this remarkable diversity, there is one feature that all these
statutes share in common: each contains a provision exempting law en-
forcement from its general terms.
Surprisingly, these law enforcement exceptions, which appear in every
generally applicable privacy statute on the federal books, have garnered vir-
tually no scholarly attention. Perhaps this is because so many laws have
sprouted up, each addressing atomistic areas of concern, that it is hard
enough to consider them collectively, much less focus comprehensively on
their relevance to policing. Indeed, federal statutory privacy law today is
notoriously "sectoral,"' 3 an umbrella under which consumer, corporate,
criminal justice, and myriad other interests mingle. Or perhaps the scholarly
tion"). Of course, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that a criminal justice system
even remotely resembling our own (in terms of professionalized police, public prosecutors, et
cetera) came into being, and federal law enforcement was all but nonexistent until the early
1900s. And, of course, the Fourth Amendment was not incorporated via due process and ap-
plied to the states until 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and the exclusionary
remedy did not apply to the states until still later, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). LAW-
RENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 61-70, 300-01
(1993).
2. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3408 (2006); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (2006); Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6502; Video
Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006); Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510; id. § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)
(known unofficially as the "Stored Communications Act"); Video Privacy Protection Act of
1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006); Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721;
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (2006); Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1986, I.R.C. § 6103 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Privacy Protection Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006); DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132;
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (known unofficially as the "Communi-
cations Indecency Act"); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551; Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); REAL ID
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 1027
and 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2006)). A listing of statutory acronyms can be found at the end of this
Article, see infra Appendix, and a helpful compendium of federal privacy laws can be found
online at CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., Existing Federal Privacy Laws, https://www.cdt.org/
privacy/guide/protect/laws.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). As this list suggests, the focus of
this Article is privacy as regards criminal investigations, not the acquisition or release of crim-
inal justice data (like "rap sheets" or conviction records), or general consumer privacy (like
"Do Not Call" statutes).




indifference reflects an assumption that law enforcement must be accorded
some way around otherwise generally applicable protections. After all, the
notion that the Fourth Amendment might occasionally wholly bar govern-
ment access to information has seemingly been abandoned, having instead
yielded to the Court's clear constitutional preference for procedural over
substantive rules. 4
But these statutes are important. It is no secret that the nature of criminal
evidence is changing. Information is less and less likely to be found in phys-
ical forms (like a day planner or printed photographs found in the home)
than in more abstract places where the strictures of the Constitution play a
less defined role (like the bits and bytes of an iPhone, Flickr account, or
Gmail calendar server). For this reason, the Fourth Amendment threshold
"reasonable expectation of privacy"5 test has been roundly criticized as in-
sufficiently adapted to a world in which our experience of privacy comes
packaged in unconventional ways 6-- whether through the settings of a Face-
book feed,7 the anonymity of an urban landscape, or even the mechanical
sophistication of scientific diagnostic tools.8
Federal privacy statutes prove interesting for a second reason: they often
cooperate with or supplant judicial decisions about the Fourth Amendment,
and thus serve as natural subjects for studying institutional design ques-
tions.9 That is, some criminal justice scholars commenced, in parallel to
questions raised about the impact of technology on criminal procedure, a
broader conversation about the allocation of power among the branches. The
groundbreaking work of Bill Stuntz critiqued the constitutionalization of
police practices in the Warren Court era as having generated unanticipated
and counterproductive consequences, thereby fueling a cavalcade of argu-
ments about the proper reach of courts.10 By thinking of criminal justice as a
4. But see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (finding that the Constitution
prohibits extraction of embedded bullet via compelled anesthetized surgery).
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In the
wake of Jones v. United States, it is now also clear that the Fourth Amendment applies to any
police action that violates a property interest, at least an interest recognizable at the time of the
Founding. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
6. E.g., Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Re-
sponse to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2009).
7. E.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amend-
ment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011).
8. E.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA DATA-
BANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (2011).
9. This debate resonates beyond criminal justice, of course, see, e.g., Edward L. Ru-
bin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996) (summarizing literature and history), but the literature tailored
to criminal justice specifically is itself quite rich. Apart from the institutional questions, there
are also long-standing debates along the rules-versus-standards line, among other questions.
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L.
REV. 227 (1984).
10. See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE (2012); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power and the Fourth
[Vol. 111:485
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system of interlocking institutions and players, Professor Stuntz also reig-
nited separation of powers and federalism debates about the most legitimate,
just, or efficient way to restrain government power.I
With respect to innovative investigative methods, Orin Kerr has persua-
sively argued that technological change is best regulated by legislative, not
constitutional, pronouncements.' 2 Focusing on the evolution of wiretapping
law as a case study, Professor Kerr first observed that courts tend to meet
new technological advances with a "relatively modest and deferential Fourth
Amendment."' 3 He then advanced a series of justifications for continued
judicial caution, grounded largely in concerns about institutional compe-
tence: primarily that legislatures are better poised to gather facts from a
wide range of interest groups about emerging technologies and are more
adept at amending enactments to keep up with rapid changes, both with re-
spect to a device's social meaning and its technical specifications. 4 More
generally, critics of expansive constitutionalization of privacy rights have
complained that it is, among other things, prone to being antidemocratic,
antifederalist, piecemeal, incoherent, impracticably opaque, and inflexible
(in that precedent is both easy to make and hard to dislodge)."
In contrast, advocates of judicial protection for constitutional interests
both dispute the positive claims of legislative superiority and defend the role
of the Constitution in safeguarding rights. They note that legislatures have
not consistently risen to defend privacy, even in cases where the Constitu-
tion has not entered the field or has opened the door to legislative
action, pointing to failures in political process. 6 The reason for legislative
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553 (1992); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of
Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, The Political Constitu-
tion]; William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969
(2008).
11. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Response, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure,
119 HARV. L. REV. F. 56 (2006), 119 HVLRF 56 (Westlaw); Robert Weisberg, Response, First
Causes and the Dynamics of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. F 131 (2006), 119 HVLRF
131 (Westlaw). For an early entry in this conversation, see Louis Fisher, Congress and the
Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REV. 107, 165-70 (1986).
12. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805, 857-87 (2004).
13. Id. at 828.
14. See id. at 857-87. Professor Kerr's analysis was most directly addressed in Daniel
J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided Call for Judicial
Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 748, 760-77 (2005), but a handful of other scholars
have also weighed in on specific aspects of this debate. E.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVA-
CY AT RISK 169-80, 201-03 (2007); Patricia L. Bellia, Designing Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 293 (2011); Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 2010, at 107, 131.
15. See Kerr, supra note 12, at 867-87; supra note 10 (collecting works by William J.
Stuntz).
16. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dicker-
son, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 4
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intransigence may vary, and "Ij]ust by entering the fray, the Court can make
it easier for legislators to stay out.' 17 But as David Sklansky has observed,
the reason for Congress's failure to act is, in the end, less important than the
fact that it does not. Without the Court, important police activities-such as
interrogations of suspects-would otherwise go wholly unregulated. 8
This Article stands at the intersection of these two lines of inquiry-at
the juncture between new technology and institutional design. This cross-
roads has generally been overlooked: perhaps the privacy scholars have
simply been too busy with consumer and data privacy to focus specifically
on criminal justice, while the criminal justice scholars have been too busy
with crime and the Fourth Amendment to focus on general privacy statutes.
But the time for greater attention has clearly come.
In United States v. Jones,'9 the Supreme Court confronted its first major
technological tool of police investigation in over a decade2": a GPS tracking
device installed on a private car. Although the plurality opinion-comically,
in the minds of some2 -resolved the issue on the basis of common law ide-
as of physical trespass, the two concurring opinions both suggested that
technological change might require a more nuanced understanding of the
scope of the Fourth Amendment.
Given the increasing salience of federal privacy enactments as a primary
source of regulation of police investigative activity, it behooves us to look at
this body of law more systematically. By comprehensively examining statu-
tory law enforcement exemptions, this Article hopes to enrich our
understanding of how legislatures have regulated privacy thus far. In its most
elemental form, my questions might roughly be summarized as follows:
What does the federal statutory approach to regulating privacy (specifically
(2001); Sklansky, supra note 11, at 61; Solove, supra note 14, at 748; Peter P. Swire, Corre-
spondence, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz., 102 MIcH. L. Rev. 904, 913-14, 919-20 (2004).
17. Sklansky, supra note 11, at 64.
18. Peter Swire has argued that rather than spurring legislative activity, a hands-off
approach by the courts "would quite likely result in an impoverishment of the legislative de-
bate about privacy and surveillance, and less effective deliberation on what safeguards are
appropriate." Swire, supra note 16, at 919-20 (observing that law enforcement views judicial
silence as judicial approval, and citing the need for the "moral and political authority of con-
stitutional doctrine").
19. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
20. The last major pronouncement along these lines was in Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001). But that case, which involved heat sensors used on the exterior of a building,
lacked the analogic and rhetorical potential of a case involving GPS trackers, which is more
readily likened to a broad range of surveillance technologies.
21. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Ironical-
ly, the Court has chosen to decide this case based on 18th-century tort law.").
22. Specifically, Justice Alito, writing for himself and three others, effectively endorsed
Professor Kerr's approach. See id. at 964 ("In circumstances involving dramatic technological
change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative." (citing Kerr, supra note 12,
at 805-06)). Justice Sotomayor, writing separately, did not agree as directly, but did warn
against "entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch,
a tool so amenable to misuse." Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
[Vol. 111:485
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from the police) look like, and in what ways does it mimic, overlap with, or
differ from the conventional Fourth Amendment constitutional approach?
Are the supposed advantages of legislative action in fact evident from the
historical record? Are there disadvantages to a judicial approach? What les-
sons might we take away from a study of federal privacy law to inform how
each institutional actor--courts and Congress-ought to approach regula-
tion of policing in the twenty-first century?
To answer these questions, Part I draws on comprehensive research ana-
lyzing the salient features of the major privacy enactments. In sum, this Part
proffers a series of observations about the nature and character of these stat-
utes and their law enforcement exemptions: 1) they emerged entirely in the
late twentieth century; 2) they are sectoral rather than comprehensive in
scope; 3) they are largely motivated by technological developments; 4) they
primarily protect the privacy of individuals, especially those in the socioec-
onomic mainstream; 5) they universally provide for law enforcement access
to covered material, relying chiefly on more complex devices than a warrant
and probable cause; 6) they strongly disfavor the exclusionary rule remedy;
7) they demonstrate no particular commitment to federalist principles; and
8) they show no particular proclivity for keeping current with changing
technological conditions.
Part II then tenders an analytic critique of constitutional versus statutory
privacy regulation as regards criminal justice and locates that critique within
the larger debate over institutional preferences for legal regulation. Among
other things, I argue that the variety of procedural tools typically found in
statutory regimes, as well as the capacity for legislative enactments to im-
pose more sensitive accountability metrics, suggests that what seems on the
surface to be diminished statutory protection for constitutional rights--
because such laws typically do not require warrants or application of the
exclusionary rule-may mask the actual degree of meaningful protection.
The Article closes with some of my own intuitions about the ideal regulato-
ry model for the future.
I. STATUTORY PRIVACY: METHODOLOGY AND OBSERVATIONS
Because close study of twenty-odd federal statutes would make for in-
credibly dull reading, I do not attempt to replicate my research here. In
brief, I examined each statute, including its legislative history and applica-
tion, through judicial and administrative records. To provide an inkling of
some of the major enactments that my research covered, consider the stat-
utes, which are listed in full in the Appendix, of the 1970s, like FCRA
(credit records), FERPA (educational records), the Internal Revenue Code
("IRS Code") (tax records), RFPA (bank records), and the Privacy Act (fed-
eral government records); the 1980s, like the PPA (journalist notes), CCPA
(cable records), SCA/ECPA (electronic records), the Pen Register Act
(dialed phone numbers), VPPA (video rental records), and CMPPA (data-
mined information); and the 1990s, like DPPA (driver's licensing records),
the DNA ID Act (genetic information), HIPAA (health records), COPPA
February 2013]
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(records from children's online activity), VVA ("upskirt" photos), and CDA
(online activity). This Part therefore analyzes fifty years of experience with
privacy legislation in order to test out some of the theses propounded above.
Before beginning, however, a word about my methodology.
A. Methodology
In embarking on this project, I first had to determine which of innumer-
able statutes should qualify for my study. After all, defining the concept of
"privacy" is notoriously difficult, and combing through a code one can find a
"privacy" dimension to many enactments. Accordingly, I found it necessary
to hone my inquiry in ways that merit brief mention here.
First, I elected to focus exclusively on federal enactments. Much of that
decision was pragmatic: there is simply too much state variation to under-
take a thorough assessment. I do acknowledge that state privacy practices
can vary considerably and may touch on important issues ignored here.23
But it is also the case that, although some states have acted as first movers in
statutory privacy, many states have simply mirrored or even copied federal
statutory analogues. 24 Nevertheless, my primary interest is in federal forms
of regulating privacy, with their power to preempt or shape state laws and
practices, particularly given my secondary interest in federal legislative
power as an alternative to constitutional pronouncements.
Second, in selecting which federal enactments to study, I essentially
asked whether the statute covered material likely to be of interest to a law
enforcement investigation. My standard was not high; if material seemed to
plausibly relate to police investigation, I included the statute. At first glance
this standard may appear circular-would we not expect law enforcement
exemptions in statutes that cover information useful to law enforcement?
Maybe. But there are no routine exemptions for persons with interests we
might deem equally as compelling-such as journalists or public health of-
ficials. And the statutes themselves cover a broad range of subjects, many of
which are not obviously candidates for automatic law enforcement exemp-
tion. More importantly, there are lessons to be learned from both the variety
and uniformity in the exemptions, as this Article illustrates.
Third, it is worth underscoring that my purpose in examining these stat-
utes is to think about them with regard to ordinary domestic criminal justice.
I therefore deliberately ignored those statutes tailored entirely to national
23. For example, states have enacted omnibus data-breach-notification provisions, state
privacy torts, trade secrets provisions, rape shield laws, and so forth, none of which are ad-
dressed in this Article. California, in particular, has been considered a leader in the area of
state privacy legislation. John R. Forbush, Comment, Regulating the Use and Sharing of Ener-
gy Consumption Data: Assessing California's SB 1476 Smart Meter Privacy Statute, 75 ALB.
L. REV. 341, 353-54 (2011-12) ("California is the first state to have an office dedicated solely
to protecting consumer privacy and the state has been a leader in passing privacy protection
statutes that go beyond the minimum 'floor' protections set out in various federal laws.").
24. See infra notes 236-240 (discussing, in the context of federalism questions, the
related debate over whether states have aggressively pursued privacy policies).
[Vol.111:485
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security, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as well as provi-
sions in general privacy statutes that pertained exclusively to national
security investigations.
25
Finally, this enterprise is admittedly imprecise. Although I have tried to
be cautious in generalizing from such a richly textured set of materials, the
assessment here is qualitative and evaluative, not quantitative and exacting.
Nevertheless, clear general principles can be extracted from the study of
federal statutory privacy, and to that end I believe I have set forth relatively
uncontroversial observations about their operation.
B. Things We Already Know:
Federal Statutory Privacy Is Recent and Patchwork
There are two universal truths about privacy statutes that should be
acknowledged by way of background. The first is that federal privacy stat-
utes represent a relatively recent phenomenon, and the second is that they
are sectoral rather than universal in character.
1. Statutory Privacy Is a Late Twentieth-Century Invention
As might be expected, federal statutes dedicated to privacy are largely
the product of the final quarter of the twentieth century. Notions of personal
privacy precede this period, but this early interest focused primarily on in-
trusions by private actors, not the government. For example, most scholars
attribute the "birth of privacy" to the seminal article The Right to Privacy,
published in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in the Harvard
Law Review. 26 That article launched privacy as a doctrinal area principally
concerned not with governmental intrusions but rather with the emergence
of a media culture interested in prurient gossip. Accordingly, the new torts
focused largely on the commercial exploitation of private information, ra-
ther than on corporate espionage or government abuse. 28
Even the earliest communication privacy statutes were aimed more at
the "protection of ... property, not the safeguarding of the individual's
25. Although national security is, of course, a form of "law enforcement" (and conced-
edly, one that often interlaces with domestic law enforcement), I find that the peculiarities of
both law and policy with regard to national security are difficult to see beyond once they are
introduced. Therefore, I have omitted those provisions in order to bring the purely domestic
issues into unobstructed view.
26. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
27. Id. at 195-96 (focusing on commercial rather than governmental invasions of priva-
cy). Reviewing the law of privacy in 1960, Professor Prosser identified four distinct torts, each
having more to do with popular publicity than with law enforcement encroachments. See Wil-
liam Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
28. See id. at 217; see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRI-
vACY LAW 11 (4th ed. 2011).
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privacy."29 Nevertheless, with the rise of Prohibition, law enforcement inter-
ception of private communication became a more salient issue. While the
Attorney General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") disa-
vowed wiretaps as "unethical," the Treasury Department embraced them.30
By 1932, Congress had considered and rejected eight bills prohibiting wire-
tapping.3' A rider along those lines briefly passed in 1933, but the enactment
of section 605 of the Federal Communications Commission Act marked the
critical point for wiretapping law. Despite strong evidence that the provision
was intended only to transfer jurisdiction from the Federal Radio Commis-
sion to the newly created Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"),
the provision's wording launched a series of challenges aimed at interpret-
ing the section as a wholesale ban on wiretaps.3 1
In deciding these cases, the Supreme Court engaged in creative readings
of the statute to effectively prohibit wiretapping without overturning its de-
cision in Olmstead v. United States, which had held that wiretapping did not
impinge on a Fourth Amendment interest. In this respect, it was actually the
Court, rather than Congress, that was the true author of these early commu-
nication privacy protections, although the instrument of transmission was
statutory interpretation rather than constitutional rulings. 33 Arguably, the
Court's interest in privacy continued to outstrip Congress's into the midcen-
tury, when the Court decided a series of substantive due process and First
Amendment cases addressing familial, sexual, and associational privacy.34
It was not until the 1970s that congressional interest in informational
privacy began to blossom. The growing reach of the administrative state,
coupled with the increasing sophistication of the commercial sector and the
emergence of new data-processing technologies, combined to create a raft of
concern over the security of private information. On the one hand, the gov-
ernment increasingly sought information to ensure compliance with legal
and administrative regulations, and market entities sought information hop-
ing to reach new consumers. On the other hand, anxiety over growing data
collection-both in terms of the kinds of records generated and the frequen-
cy with which they were stored and accessed-prompted concerns about
29. See JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 199 (1966) (describing early interception stat-
utes as concerned with "malicious injury").
30. Id. at 200-01.
31. Id. at 205.
32. See id. at 206-07.
33. Significantly, this historical interpretation suggests that although it is true that
courts historically have not "engage[d] in creative normative inquiries into privacy and techno-
logical change when applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies," Kerr, supra note
12, at 831, that may in part be because they reserve that creativity for the interpretation of
congressional statutes. It is thus difficult to determine exactly which institution to consider the
true agent of protection.
34. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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threats to personal privacy, and especially the government's abuse of inti-
mate information.3"
Thus, starting in 1970 with the passage of the FCRA, and followed
quickly by the passage of the Privacy Act, FERPA, RFPA, and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress embarked on a course of identifying
discrete threatened interests and extending particularized protections via
statute. Accordingly, there was a surge of privacy laws passed in the 1970s,36
aided in part by the Watergate scandal and publication of the Privacy Protec-
tion Study Commission's report, Personal Privacy in an Information
Society.37 Congress's interest in statutory privacy endured and, as is evident
from the Appendix, five or six pieces of privacy legislation were passed in
each of the ensuing decades. In sum, whereas the earliest common law ef-
forts to address privacy were shaped by the fear that private citizens would
exploit technology for private gain,38 modem federal statutory privacy law is
shaped by equally strong concerns about governmental collection and abuse
of intimate information.
2. Statutory Privacy Protection Is Piecemeal, Sectoral, and Reactive
Fifty years of federal legislative interest in privacy has resulted in one
commonly recognized and often lamented fact: American privacy law is
extraordinarily piecemeal. As Paul Schwartz, one of the foremost scholars
of consumer privacy, acknowledged, "In contrast to the approach in many
other nations, it is unusual in the United States to find any comprehensive
privacy laws."3 9 Whereas Europe has embraced a coherent, comprehensive
approach to privacy regulation, the United States has largely relied on in-
dependent enactments tailored to particular sectors or interests.40 No single
35. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and
the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1164-65 (2002).
36. George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 623, 633 (1980).
37. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1977). The report offered a comprehensive assessment of the state of individual privacy rights
and recordkeeping practices across a range of environments, with special emphasis on the
private sector.
38. See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 196 (worrying primarily about the
press and the rising "trade" in gossip). See generally SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 28, at
11. The earliest common law privacy torts reflected the private nature of these concerns, with
rights of action created for public disclosure of private facts, intrusion upon seclusion, false
light, and appropriation-all of which seem most concerned with private or commercial ex-
ploitation of confidences. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977).
39. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1632.
40. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 250-51 (2011) (comparing American model with the
"model of protection adopted throughout Europe: omnibus [Fair Information Practices
Principles]-based privacy principles in law or binding codes, interpreted and monitored by
... [an] independent privacy agency"). However, on March 16, 2011, the Obama Admin-
istration issued a statement calling on Congress to enact a consumer "privacy bill of rights."
Juliana Gruenwald, Commerce Department Official to Make Case for Privacy Bill of
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agency is entrusted with supervising privacy in the United States, nor does
there appear to be a single guiding principle or theory.41 The word "patch-
work" is often used to describe the statutory protections, 42 and usually as a
critique.
Nevertheless, when I began this research, I expected to find some stat-
utes that directly addressed law enforcement interests and some in which
those interests were incidental. I thought I might be able to classify stat-
utes according to the material protected-for instance, those explicitly
regulating police investigative activity (like Title III, ECPA, or the DNA
Identification Act), those directly aimed at general consumer privacy (like
HIPAA, CCPA, RFPA, GINA, or the VPPA), and those aimed at regulating
information acquired by the government (like the Privacy Act, DPPA,
FERPA, or the IRS Code). But although that was to some degree true
(such as with statutes like FISA or COPPA), I learned that most statutes
were both motivated by and enacted in response to a range of public and
private concerns. For example, passing the Wiretap Act was as much about
preventing corporate espionage as it was about circumscribing police
power,43 and HIPAA drafters worried as much about personal data being
abused by the government as they did about misuse by researchers or the
insurance industry.
Categorizing statutes according to the degree to which privacy is their
primary focus likewise failed to provide meaningful insights. Rarely was
only one purpose identifiable, and it was hard to classify, much less rank,
concerns as diverse as job discrimination," overzealous researchers, 45 free-
Rights, NAT'L J. (Mar. 16, 2011, 9:15 AM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/
commerce-department-official-to-make-case-for-privacy-bill-of-rights-20110316 (reporting
on written testimony of National Telecommunications and Information Administration head
Lawrence Strickling before the Senate Commerce Committee).
41. The major exception to this rule, however, is the Privacy Act, which is a form of an
omnibus protection.
42. See generally FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 80 (1997) (de-
scribing American law as "a patchwork of uneven, inconsistent, and often irrational" federal
and state rules); Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 40, at 249, 258 & n.32 (citing sources and
noting that "[flhe dominant critique denounces the existing patchwork of privacy statutes as
weak, incomplete, and fractured").
43. The drafters defined the problem of technological developments as centered on
fears that "[c]ommerical and employer-labor espionage is becoming widespread. It is becom-
ing increasingly difficult to conduct business meetings in private. Trade secrets are betrayed.
Labor and management plans are revealed." S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 67 (1968), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154. The list did go on to worry that "each man's personal, marital,
religious, political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted" but it reads like an after-
thought. id. ECPA echoed these concerns: "Electronic hardware making it possible for
overzealous law enforcement agencies, industrial spies and private parties to intercept the
personal or proprietary communications of others are readily available in the American market
today." S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556-57.
44. See, for example, FERPA, HIPAA, and GINA.
45. See, for example, HIPAA and the DNA Identification Act.
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dom of speech,46 government abuse,47 corporate powers and marketing, 48
and crime prevention.
The same problems arose in an attempt to classify statutes according to
the entity holding the information. First, although in some instances a gov-
ernment entity exclusively controls the information (e.g., DPPA, the IRS
Code, Privacy Act), a unitary label of "government" seemed indefensible
given that some federal statutes target the federal government, while others
regulate states and localities (e.g., the IRS Code and Privacy Act versus the
DPPA and FERPA). Moreover, many statutes implicate both public and pri-
vate interests-healthcare and education providers can be either public or
private entities, and heavily regulated utilities like phone or cable have qua-
si-public status. Even banking, a quintessentially private industry, has a
strong public component in that many institutions are federally insured.
Nor did the comprehensiveness of a statutory scheme prove a useful
sorting device. There certainly are statutes that regulate privacy more broad-
ly than others-the Privacy Act, HIPAA, and FERPA each cover a wide
range of entities and materials whereas statutes like VPPA and COPPA tar-
get niche interests. And some statutes target privacy directly (like the
Privacy Act, CCPA, RFPA, and VPPA) whereas others regulate it indirectly,
as just one component in a larger regulatory regime (like HIPAA, FERPA,
and FCRA). But all such distinctions, while certainly reasonable, offered
little payoff for my purposes. For instance, it does not seem to have much
effect on the terms of a statute that it is specifically targeted to privacy ver-
sus some other special interest. Nor does scope seem to have a meaningful
impact on the remedies available, the scope of the law enforcement exemp-
tion, or other characteristics particularly relevant to criminal justice.
Finally, given my focus on law enforcement exemptions, I thought it
worthwhile to consider the relationship between statutory coverage and the
corresponding degree of protection under the Constitution. Here, I met with
moderate success: by and large, these exemptions do appear to chiefly regu-
late law enforcement activity in areas of indeterminate constitutional
protection. That is, imagine three scenarios in which Congress intervenes to
regulate privacy statutorily: (1) when the Constitution would otherwise pro-
hibit the law enforcement action; (2) when it is unclear whether the
Constitution would permit or forbid it; and (3) when the Constitution per-
mits an activity that Congress wishes to curtail. Title III, the PPA, and
arguably the DNA Act are the only statutes targeted at conduct explicitly
governed by the Fourth Amendment; the PPA adds to the protection accord-
ed by the Constitution, whereas the other two essentially match it. 49
Conversely, only the RFPA, FCRA, and the Pen Register Act occupy a space
46. See, for example, CCPA, VPPA, and the PPA.
47. See, for example, ECPA, FERPA, and HIPAA.
48. See, for example, FCRA, COPPA, ECPA, and DPPA.
49. It was not clear at the time the DNA Act was enacted that this was the case, alt-
hough precedent strongly suggested that collection of DNA from individuals-even convicted
felons-would implicate Fourth Amendment interests.
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explicitly left vacant by cases declaring the absence of a cognizable consti-
tutional interest.5 0 The remaining statutes falls into a void of uncertain
protection-where the Court has neither expressly declared nor denied a
legitimate expectation of privacy.
That is not to say that a rough appraisal of a particular statute's constitu-
tionality is impossible: many statutes address situations likely governed by
the so-called "third-party doctrine," which holds that information knowingly
exposed to a third party ceases to be private and thus receives no Fourth
Amendment protection." But such guesswork is just that-there are contra-
ry indications that some information held by third parties, like health
records or email records, might in fact garner constitutional protection.52
Nevertheless, as I explore in greater depth in Section I.C, ambiguous consti-
tutional status hardly appears determinative: there are ample areas that
Congress has chosen not to regulate, despite the clear absence of constitu-
tional protection. In sum, my survey suggests that the federal code lacks not
just an omnibus provision protecting privacy but also any principled basis
for defending the piecemeal protections it does contain.
Indeed, if anything seems clear from an examination of the legislative
history of privacy statutes, it is that Congress does less leading and much
more following when it comes to regulating privacy. The most common
prompt for legislation is some catalyzing event, whether a Supreme Court
case,53 a newspaper story,54 or a tragic incident.55 Close examination of stat-
utory privacy protections simply affirms what the critics utter in complaint:
50. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976).
51. See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 435.
52. For example, the Supreme Court in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67
(2001), invalidated a joint program between hospital workers and police to identify cocaine-
addicted pregnant women. Although the ultimate holding rested on an opaque set of theories,
the Court found that the women retained a privacy interest in their collected urine samples and
the resulting tests. Id. at 1288, Because the hospital workers were county officials, however,
the Court did not have to address whether the entanglement with law enforcement would itself
have been enough to violate the Constitution. Id. at 1287. With regard to email, the Sixth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Warshak, 631 F3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010), recently held that the defendant
had an expectation of privacy in his emails, and that his privacy was violated when agents
compelled his internet service provider to hand his emails over without a warrant or probable
cause. The court, however, found that the exclusionary rule did not apply. Id. at 288. More
recently, Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957
(2012), suggested that the third-party doctrine might need revisiting.
53. For example, Miller, 425 U.S. 435, prompted passage of the RFPA; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), prompted passage of Title 11I; and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547, 565 (1978), prompted passage of the PPA.
54. For example, an article about Robert Bork inspired the VPPA, as recounted infra in
the text accompanying note 65. Likewise, an article in Parade magazine about student records
inspired Senator Buckley, who entered the article into the Congressional Record, to push for
the passage of FERPA. See 120 CONG. REC. 13,953 (1974).
55. For example, the DPPA was passed after it came to light that actress Rebecca
Schaeffer had been murdered by a stalker who had easily obtained her address from the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles. See 140 CONG. REc. 7924-25 (1994) (statement of Rep. Moran).
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that regulations are atomistic, inconsistent, atheoretical, and idiosyncratic.
But despite an inability to slot federal privacy statutes into one coherent
model, I believe that some conclusions may still be drawn, especially re-
garding criminal justice.
C. Statutes Tend to Address Technology-Based Concerns
Given the broad range of motivations explored above, we might expect
that no single thread ties general privacy statutes together. But, in fact, near-
ly all statutes seem to share one galvanizing interest: technology. Just as the
"[r]ecent inventions" of "[i]nstantaneous photographs ... and numerous
mechanical devices ' 56 prompted the birth of privacy at the start of the twen-
tieth century, so too have more recent technologies propelled the enactment
of privacy statutes in that same century's final quarter.
Of course, many privacy statutes broadcast this connection via titles that
reference electronic communications, online activities, cable, and DNA. But
concerns about electronic recordkeeping emerge in other less overtly tech-
nology-based statutes as well. Starting with the grandfather of federal
privacy, the Privacy Act of 1974, the theme emerges clearly. The progenitor
of the Privacy Act was a series of hearings and reports centered on modem
government data-gathering and recordkeeping methods. One passage of the
Senate Report concluded as follows:
When this quite natural tendency of Government to acquire and keep and
share information about citizens is enhanced by computer technology and
when it is subjected to the unrestrained motives of countless political
administrators, the resulting threat to individual privacy make [sic] it
necessary for Congress to reaffirm the principle of limited, responsive
Government on behalf of freedom. 7
HIPAA was likewise motivated by concerns that federal efforts to en-
hance administrative efficiency would, in light of new technologies, render
sensitive medical information more vulnerable to improper disclosure.58 The
RFPA was in large part a response to federal laws mandating collection and
retention of financial transaction data, which spawned concerns over
56. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 195.
57. S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6919.
58. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,465 (Dec. 28, 2000) ("This ease of information collection, organization, retention,
and exchange made possible by the advances in computer and other electronic technology
affords many benefits to individuals and to the health care industry."); Peter H.W. van der
Goes, Jr., Comment, Opportunity Lost: Why and How to Improve the HHS-Proposed Legisla-
tion Governing Law Enforcement Access to Medical Records, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1009, 1012
(1999); see also Kevin B. Davis, Privacy Rights in Personal Information: HIPAA and the
Privacy Gap Between Fundamental Privacy Rights and Medical Information, 19 J. MAR-
SHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 535, 536 (2001); Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The
Nationalization of Health Information Privacy Protections, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 283, 286 (2002).
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potential abuse of "modern information technologies. '59 Variations on the
same theme are visible even in the DPPA6° and FERPA, although less pro-
nouncedly so.6' At times, the articulated fear was that the government could
abuse the electronic stores of information that it had either generated or col-
lected, as was the concern with RFPA, HIPAA, FERPA, DPPA, Real ID,
DNA, the IRS Code, and the Privacy Act. At other times, Congress seemed
to be responding instead to the rising concern that private parties would ex-
ploit technology for private benefit 62-as was the concern with FCRA,
COPPA, 63 and the VVPA. In every case, the fear was that technology had
changed, and therefore imperiled, the recording, storage, retrieval, and shar-
ing of information.
To illustrate just how pervasive the technological commonality is, con-
sider a final example: the VPPA. At the most superficial level, the statute
obviously responds to new technology-specifically, home video rentals.
But the tale of the statute's inspiration confounds this technological connec-
tion, since the law was precipitated by a Washington City Paper story about
then-Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork, which revealed a list of 146
59. See Nancy M. Kirschner, The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978-The Con-
gressional Response to United States v. Miller: A Procedural Right to Challenge Government
Access to Financial Records, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 10, 24 (1979).
60. Passage of the DPPA was prompted by a series of high-profile cases in which stalk-
ers or other criminal offenders obtained access to personal information of potential victims
through routine inquiries at state departments of motor vehicles; this concern was heightened
by the perception that a lucrative financial market existed for states to sell such information to
private entities. See, e.g., Protecting Drive [sic] Privacy: Hearing on H.R. 3365 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.
(1994) (statement of Janlori Goldman, Director, Privacy and Technology Project, American
Civil Liberties Union), available at 1994 WL 212813.
61. FERPA "was perceived as a parental rights bill designed to halt government intru-
sion," and its primary sponsor, Senator Buckley, "noted that the Watergate revelations had
emphasized the dangers of government data gathering and the abuse of personal files." Ellen
M. Bush, The Buckley Amendment and Campus Police Reports (Aug. 8, 1992) (unpublished
student conference paper), microformed on ERIC No. ED 351 677 (U.S. Dep't of Educ.).
62. See, e.g., CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006) (creating pen-
alties for bulk junk email); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 and Identity
Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006) (dealing with identity
theft); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (Supp. V
2011); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)
(offering protection from telemarketers). The major exception seems to be the Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 1980, which affords journalists extra protection against government searches of
their offices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006); see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6801-6809 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (regulating the disclosure of data by financial institu-
tions, among other things).
63. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006)
(passed specifically to deal with private entities' collection and exploitation of information
about children's activities online).
64. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006) (targeted exclu-
sively at criminalizing "upskirt" images). The statutory language reveals a particular focus on
technological means of recording---covering "videotape, photograph, film, record ... or
broadcast." Id. § 1801(b)(l).
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videos he had rented from his local store.65 To the extent that the technologi-
cal advance of VHS was an issue, it had to do with the fact that renting
movies to enjoy at home offered an opportunity to pierce the anonymity of a
person's entertainment choices.
Yet the same threat to privacy could be posed by a journalist seeking in-
formation about choices that have nothing to do with VHS movies. The
legislative history affirms as much. Sprinkled throughout the record are con-
cerns along these lines:
[I]n an era of interactive television cables, the growth of computer check-
ing and check-out counters, of security systems and telephones, all lodged
together in computers, it would be relatively easy at some point to give a
profile of a person and tell what they buy in a store, what kind of food they
like, what sort of television programs they watch, who are some of the
people they telephone.... I think that is wrong. I think that really is Big
Brother, and I think it is something that we have to guard against.66
And so the story is one of technology used to record, and potentially reveal,
material information like dietary or consumer choices. Technology poses the
threat of data assemblage and exploitation-even though the underlying
data might be as primitive as local library records.
Tellingly, though, Congress passed a statute about video rentals, not
grocery store receipts or library books. And it did this despite the fact that
the bill went through most of the legislative process titled the Video and
Library Privacy Protection Act. Most of the hearings centered on library
book privacy, and many of the statements focused on books, not videocas-
settes. Yet the library provisions did not survive. In the final Senate Report
accompanying the enacted VPPA, there is only one short reference to library
records:
Although the original impetus for the legislation was the disclosure of
Judge Bork's video rental list, the bill's sponsors, Senators Leahy, Grass-
ley, Simpson and Simon, included a similar protection for library borrower
records, recognizing that there is a close tie between what one views and
what one reads.
The subcommittee reported a restriction on the disclosure of library bor-
rower records similar to the one on video records. However, the committee
65. S. REP. No. 100-599, at 5-6 (1988), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342, 4344.
The story did not, in the end, reveal anything terribly damning, as the judge was revealed to be
"a PG-to-G sort of fellow" who preferred mysteries and action-adventure, with a slight taste
for British costume dramas. Michael Dolan, The Bork Tapes, WASH. CITY PAPER, Sept. 25-
Oct. 1, 1987, reproduced at http://www.theamericanporch.combork2.htm.
66. S. REP. No. 100-599, at 5-6 (1988) (alterations in original) (statement of Sen.
Leahy). The rest of the Senate Report includes numerous additional references to concerns
about technologically enhanced recordkeeping. E.g., id. at 6 (statement of Sen. Simon)
("There is no denying that the computer age has revolutionized our world."); id. at 7 (state-
ment of Janlori Goldman, Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) ("These precious rights
have grown increasingly vulnerable with the growth of advanced information technology.").
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was unable to resolve questions regarding the application of such a provi-
sion for law enforcement.67
In other words, despite the similarities between books and videos, and
even despite the common concern of technological aggregation, law en-
forcement interests were sufficient to overcome the privacy interests in the
former, but not the latter.68 And, of course, it is not just library records that
have eluded congressional action. The Supreme Court has rejected privacy
claims in a variety of brick-and-mortar interests-like in discarded trash69 or
the open fields of private land°--and those rulings all met with congres-
sional silence.
In sum, across the breadth of federally enacted statutes dedicated pri-
marily to the protection of privacy, the theme of technological advancement
emerges as a common thread. To be sure, there are obviously areas in which
technology threatens privacy and yet the federal legislature has not
67. Id. at 8.
68. Reader privacy is a contentious area. For instance, the Supreme Court has indirectly
suggested that there might be some constitutional protection for reader privacy, United States
v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 48 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring) (oft-cited concurrence suggesting
privacy in context of review of conviction of bookseller who refused to disclose customer lists
to House committee), but it has also repeatedly held that there is no heightened Fourth
Amendment scrutiny for law enforcement actions that implicate First Amendment interests,
see, e.g., New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 (1986) (rejecting argument that high-
er standard of probable cause was required to support warrant to seize material protected by
First Amendment); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 466, 469 (1985) (rejecting heightened
scrutiny for police officer's purchase of magazine from bookstore); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, 565-66 (1978) (rejecting argument for higher standard to seize material from
newspaper office). But cf In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords, Inc., 26
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1599, 1601 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding First Amendment interests super-
seded government interest in gaining access to patron's records); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City
of Thomton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1047 (Colo. 2002) (holding that "the Colorado Constitution re-
quires that the innocent bookseller be afforded an opportunity for an adversarial hearing prior
to execution of a search warrant seeking customer purchase records" and finding search war-
rant at issue not enforceable). There is no general federal statutory protection for reader
privacy, although the Privacy Act might be deemed to provide limited protection in the context
of federal libraries. The primary protection derives from state privacy laws (some of which
have law enforcement exemptions, see, e.g., Thx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.124(a)(3) (West
2011)), as well as ethical norms promulgated by the American Library Association, see gener-
ally Jennifer Elmore, Note, Effective Reader Privacy for Electronic Books: A Proposal, 34
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 127, 130-32 (2011). It may be that the lack of consensus about
the library-records provision signaled the preference of privacy-protective legislators to leave
the area untouched rather than explicity craft a law enforcement exemption.
69. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that there is no expectation
of privacy in trash). The Bork episode provides a perfect example of this, as the journalist
likened his search to the well-established journalistic practice of rifling through the trash for
clues-a statutorily (and constitutionally) unregulated activity. Dolan, supra note 65 (likening
quest for video rental records to A.J. Weberman's scrutiny of Bob Dylan's trash and general
pursuit of "garbageology").
70. E.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (no expectation of privacy in
open fields); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (plurality opinion) (no expecta-
tion of privacy in conversations with informants).
[Vol. 111:485
Privacy in the Criminal Justice System
responded.71 Nonetheless, it is remarkable that the overwhelming majority
of federal privacy statutes address one particularly threatening thing.
D. Law Enforcement Interests Dominate
If technology issues propel the expansion of federal privacy protections,
then another interest-law enforcement--can be said to curtail it. The story
of the library-records provision, recounted above, is just one example of the
powerful influence of law enforcement. Study of the scope of these statutes
reveals three truths: first, virtually no privacy statutes erect absolute bars to
access; second, law enforcement is the sole interest consistently exempted
from general provisions; and third, law enforcement regularly offers its per-
spective on, and plays a critical role in shaping, not just those exemptions
but the terms of the statutes themselves.
Significantly, no current statute erects an absolute bar to accessing its
regulated material. This need not, of course, be the case. For example, in
1967, President Johnson publicly denounced wiretapping in his State of the
Union address, saying that "[w]e should outlaw all wiretapping-public and
private-wherever and whenever it occurs, except when the security of this
Nation itself is at stake-and only then with the strictest governmental safe-
guards. And we should exercise the full reach of our constitutional powers
to outlaw electronic 'bugging' and 'snooping.' "72 A somewhat more recent
statutory model even exists: when a law protecting the privacy of substance
abuse treatment records was first enacted in 1970, it proclaimed a total ban
on disclosure absent patient consent.73 Legislators even decried as "undesir-
able" a provision in the original bill that allowed limited access. In
successfully securing the deletion of even that narrow provision, they argued
that if "information of nonconsenting persons may be disclosed under court
order ... [it] could result in a widespread notion among individuals with
71. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (aircraft); Dow Chem. Co.
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (same); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285
(1983) (beepers); Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1247 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding no
Fourth Amendment violation in film developers' sale of duplicate set of defendants' photo-
graphic prints, without either warrant or probable cause); id. at 1243 n.5 (citing similar cases).
None of these areas has been the subject of federal legislation. Note that my claim is not that
all technological intrusions receive legislative protection; rather, it is that current privacy pro-
tections all share technology in common.
72. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PuB. PAPERS 2, 6
(Jan. 10, 1967). This view was common in the early twentieth century; Attorney General Har-
lan Stone announced in 1924 that the FBI considered wiretapping "unethical." See, e.g.,
LANDYNSKI, supra note 29, at 199 (citation omitted). His position was consistent with the
sentiments of the time; in 1918, Congress passed a law outlawing wiretapping, but it expired
at the end of the war. Jd. at 199.
73. Although initially enacted as a total bar on disclosure of such records absent patient
consent, Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabili-
tation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-616, § 333, 84 Stat. 1848, 1853, subsequent amendments
permit disclosure in limited circumstances, namely medical emergency, for scientific research
if anonymized, and by court order on good cause where there is a need to avert death or seri-
ous bodily harm. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(b)(2) (2006).
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alcohol problems ... that the prohibition against disclosure of their personal
records is subject to a powerful exception. 74 Indeed, although subsequent
amendments have loosened these strictures, the statute still forbids the use
of records to "initiate or substantiate any criminal charges against a pa-
tient."75
But every other federal statute has, from its inception, provided con-
trolled access for an assortment of entities, including researchers, public
health officials, emergency responders, educators, therapists, medical pro-
fessionals, and agency regulators-just to name a few.76 Yet while these
identities change, the law enforcement exemption stays the same. Criminal
conduct statutes make such exceptionalism sharply visible, since the exemp-
tions often stand alone. The VVPA, for instance, prohibits surreptitious
photographing of private body parts, but exempts "lawful law enforcement,
correctional, or intelligence activity."77 Similarly, the Telephone Records and
Privacy Protection Act of 2006 makes "pretexting" a crime, but exempts
"law enforcement agencies. 7' The CFAA regulates "hacking" and applies to
all but "lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity
of a law enforcement agency."79
This heedfulness to the needs of law enforcement does not occur spon-
taneously. Instead, unsurprisingly, law enforcement representatives regularly
and routinely weigh in to address the impact that statutory protections will
have on their interests, and to help shape or guide the scope of the inevitable
law enforcement exemption. Of course, for a statute that is largely defined
by its law enforcement provisions, like the Wiretap Act, this might be ex-
pected. But history shows that law enforcement typically offers comments
on a wide range of proposed legislation, and resistance by law enforcement
may hinder or even prevent the passage of a generally applicable statute.
Law enforcement resistance to financial privacy protections caused many
standstills before the RFPA was successfully enacted. 80 Similarly, HIPAA
drafters explicitly noted that the regulations were not intended to affect law
74. H.R. REP. No. 91-1663, at 18 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5719, 5736.
The statute was so enacted. See Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention,
Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970 § 333, 84 Stat. at 1853.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(c) (2006). These amendments introduced exceptions that
parallel those found in l-HPAA, including for use in medical emergencies and anonymous
research. Id. § 290dd-2(b)(2).
76. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3413 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (RFPA provisions exempting regula-
tors); 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(5) (2006) (allowing access to motor vehicle records for
researchers); id. § 2518(7) (allowing for emergency interception of wire transmissions).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1801(c).
78. Id. § 1039(g)(Supp. V 2011).
79. Id. § 1030(0 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
80. Numerous financial privacy bills had been introduced from as early as 1973; in fact,
over five congressional hearings had been held on the topic. But in each case, law enforcement
interests vigorously opposed, and ultimately killed, any legislation restricting law enforcement
access to financial records. See Kirschner, supra note 59, at 28.
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enforcement access in any way but were intended only to heighten penalties
in the event of misuse.81
In contrast, it is less common that a privacy-protective entity with a spe-
cific focus on criminal justice issues weighs in. The repeat players
advocating for privacy before legislators are all-purpose organizations like
the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and the Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation. As such, their agenda tends to focus largely on mainstream
socioeconomic concerns. Less commonly seen are representatives of privacy
interests specific to domestic criminal justice and the populations most af-
fected by domestic policing, whether defined as groups like the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers or the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, the Innocence Project, or even the Legal Defense
Fund or the Urban League.82 There is no single NGO or interest group dedi-
cated exclusively to protecting the privacy of the policed poor. There are
instead general criminal justice NGOs with a long list of other matters to
attend to (e.g., the death penalty, the right to counsel, et cetera), minority- or
poverty-focused groups that likewise fill their dockets with topics like anti-
discrimination and welfare reform, and generalized privacy entities that tend
to focus their attention on mainstream concerns like general consumer pri-
vacy. For this reason, in perusing the legislative history of many of these
enactments, it is not uncommon to find comments or testimony from repre-
sentatives of the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the FBI, and other state and
local law enforcement and prosecutorial entities (mainly through profes-
sional associations) focused exclusively on the question of law enforcement
access, while the contrary views are mainly addressed to the general
81. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONFIDENTIALITY OF INDIVIDUALLY-
IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, PURSUANT TO SECTION 264 OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996, at ll.E.9 (1997), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
medical/hhsrecommendations_1997.html ("We are not recommending any changes to exist-
ing legal constraints that govern access to or use of patient information by law enforcement
agencies.").
82. The reason for this is perhaps clear. A quick review of those organizations' web-
sites, some of which list congressional testimony, reveal a busy docket focused on issues
exclusively related to criminal justice. See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'N CRIM. DEF. LAW., Federal Ac-
tion, http://www.nacdl.org/federalaction/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (listing legislative
priorities as crime labs and forensics reform, discovery reform, grand jury reform, indigent
defense, national security, sentencing reform, sex offenses, street gangs, and white-collar
crime); History of NLADA, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, http://www.nlada.org/
About/AboutHistoryNLADA (last visited Aug. 29, 2012) (detailing focus on right to and
quality of counsel issues, along with civil matters); Reports and Publications, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/reports.php (last visited Aug. 29, 2012) (an-
nual reports detailing testimony on topics such as post-conviction review, improvements in
forensic science, state laws on DNA access, wrongful convictions, and eyewitness identifica-
tion); Signature Programs, NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, http://www.nul.org/what-we-do/
our-signature-programs (last visited Aug. 29, 2012) (describing focus on legislative issues
such as work and housing opportunities).
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provisions of the law, rather than with specific attention to its law enforce-
ment exemptions.
Accordingly, although generalizations are more subjective and hence
riskier here, it might be argued that more than any other factor, the greatest
determinant of the scope of a law enforcement exemption is the degree to
which law enforcement deems the covered material important. For example,
the statutes for the most part allow law enforcement ready access to drivers'
records, electronic records (like emails), health records, and basic credit
identification information. The DPPA, ECPA, HIPAA, and FCRA all ad-
dress information commonly accessed in criminal investigations, and each
contains provisions that allow disclosure on the basis of a simple adminis-
trative request of law enforcement. At the other end of the spectrum, less
seemingly probative material such as video rental records and cable records
(for instance, pay-per-view history) are exceptionally difficult to obtain, re-
quiring heightened evidentiary showings and formal process.83 The passage
of the VPPA provides one plausible example of the power of law enforce-
ment: the VPPA is unusual in that it provides a statutory exclusionary rule,
which arguably is the result of the atypical silence of law enforcement inter-
ests during the short period surrounding its passage.8 4
Of course, this rule is not without exception. Most pertinently, areas pro-
tected specifically by the Fourth Amendment-such as wiretapping of
phone lines-require heightened protection (warrant and probable cause)
and yet cover very useful investigative material. Similarly, the PPA restricts
search warrants of journalists' offices beyond the constitutional standard and
yet it is easy to imagine that this information is also frequently helpful.
Conversely, there are statutes such as FERPA that have restrictive-access
provisions and yet regulate information likely to be of limited utility for
most law enforcement investigations.
Nevertheless, the degree of protection from law enforcement seems far
more likely to turn on whether the information is useful in investigations
than it does on widely shared intuitive notions of what is more or less de-
serving of privacy,85 suggesting the strength of law enforcement's ability to
influence the scope of exemptions. Perhaps for this reason, the law en-
forcement exceptions take highly individualized shapes. They are neither
blanket provisions permitting unfettered access nor cookie-cutter templates
83. See infra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
84. The VPPA was enacted quickly in the wake of the Bork incident, and the bulk of
the hearings were consumed either by the initial provisions of the bill that also would have
protected library records or by the concerns of direct marketers. See Video and Library Priva-
cy Protection Act of 1988: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Tech. & the Law
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 123-25 (1989). For reasons unclear from the
record, the FBI declined to testify with regard to the bill and instead promised to submit writ-
ten comments, which never arrived. Id. at 146. The DOJ submitted written comments but they
focused on various access provisions rather than the remedy for violation. See id. at 150.
85. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 184 (reporting results of empirical study on expec-
tations of privacy).
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replicated across every statute. But before turning to that variation, the next
Section considers two situations in which law enforcement interests tend to
trump all other interests, resulting in not just diminished privacy protections
but also the imposition of affirmative disclosure obligations.
E. Protection Focuses on Individuals, Not Entities, and Especially
Members of the Economic Mainstream
Just as technology to some degree drives the expansion of federal priva-
cy law, and law enforcement to some degree slows it down, there are two
other characteristics of federal privacy protection that might be noted. First,
federal statutory privacy law tends to be protective of individual, not entity,
interests. And second, federal statutory privacy law tends to be protective of
mainstream, not marginal, socioeconomic interests.
1. Individuals, Not Entities
Privacy statutes appear quite deliberately to protect the interests of indi-
viduals, as opposed to corporations or other collective entities.86 This was
perhaps made starkly clear in the recent Supreme Court case FCC v. AT&T
Inc., in which the Court held in a brief, unanimous opinion that federal pro-
tections for "personal privacy"-in that case, an exemption in the Freedom
of Information Act-applied only to individuals and not to corporations.8 7
Other statutes reflect a similar orientation: The RFPA covers financial rec-
ords only of a "person," defined as "an individual or a partnership of five or
fewer individuals."88 Likewise, the FCRA defines "consumer" as "an indi-
vidual" and focuses on "consumer report[s]." 89
Of course, there are exceptions: Title III and the SCA cover communica-
tions by corporate agents as well as private individuals, 90 and the IRS Code
extends to entity and not just individual returns. 91 But the bulk of dedicated
86. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 299 (1981) (noting that "the
general trend of legislative activity was to increase the privacy of individuals.., and decrease
that of business firms and other organizations" while acknowledging that "[t]he pattern is
actually more complicated"). There are many distinctions that have been made between indi-
vidual and entity privacy. For instance, a public corporation is typically heavily regulated, and
must by law disclose a wide swath of information. Even a privately held company might have
a broad array of legal obligations to disclose or publish certain information, or to make such
information available to regulators. Moreover, privacy is typically justified by reference to the
needs of personal autonomy, freedom from embarrassment or humiliation, or basic principles
of liberty-none of which is as readily translated to the inanimate corporate context.
87. 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011).
88. 12 U.S.C. § 3401(4) (2006).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 168la(c)-(d) (2006).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6) (2006).
91. Privacy does, however, vary according to the nature of the return filed. See 26
U.S.C. § 6103 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). For instance, joint returns are limited to disclosure to
one of the filing parties, whereas a C corporation return can be disclosed to board of directors'
designees, officers, and employees as approved by the principal and certain shareholders. Id.
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federal privacy statutes appear concerned primarily with individual privacy:
DPPA regulates individual driver's licenses, while most business licenses
are public. 92 And numerous statutes, including some primarily aimed at per-
sonal privacy, require active disclosure of the same information as regards
business entities. 93
2. The Poor
It is not just collective entities that are often excluded from privacy's
protective reach. Historically, federal statutory privacy laws have also left
unprotected-or even deliberately exposed-the private matters of those in
the lower socioeconomic classes. 94
Consider, for instance, federal legislation conditioning public assistance
grants. With regard to public housing, federal law states that any contracting
agency "shall furnish any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer,
upon the request of the officer, with the current address, Social Security
number, and photograph (if applicable) of any recipient of assistance."95 To
make such a request, an officer need not have any formal legal process or be
investigating a housing-related claim. Instead, she need only provide a name
and an assurance that the person "has information that is necessary for the
officer to conduct the officer's official duties," is a fugitive felon, or is in
violation of probation or parole.96 In other words, an investigator seeking a
peripheral witness can obtain from the housing authority that witness's ad-
dress, Social Security number, and photograph without any showing of
suspicion or process of any kind. Moreover, this provision applies
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law"; thus, even if a state were to
attempt to provide greater privacy for its denizens, it would not succeed. 97
And the penalty for violating the provision by obtaining information under
§ 6103(e)(1)(B), (D). For an interesting history of tax privacy, see Joshua D. Blank, In De-
fense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J. 265 (2011).
92. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2006).
93. There are also some independent protections for corporate information like trade
secrets, see, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2006 & Supp. V
2011), as well as for copyright, trademark, and other legal doctrines that serve the goals of
entity privacy or control over information dissemination, see, e.g., Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006) (liability for bad faith in registering domain
names), and restrictions on the sharing of business data with various governmental entities,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 176a (bureau of commerce); 13 U.S.C. § 402 (economic analysis and labor
statistics).
94. Of course, this thesis is not absolute. The government has long sold information
collected during the census, which obviously applies across socioeconomic boundaries, with-
out any interference from Congress. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 35, at 1149-50. Conversely,
a federal statute has long protected the privacy of records related to substance abuse treatment
(which might be deemed a less mainstream interest). See supra notes 73-75 and accompany-
ing text.
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"false pretenses" or disclosing it improperly is a fine-only misdemeanor
conviction or possible civil liability.98
Similarly, although the original welfare legislation contained some pri-
vacy safeguards,9 9 the passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA")0'° significantly eroded
the protection afforded to welfare recipients. The federal welfare provisions,
or Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF") as it is now known,
not only fail to impose any procedural barriers to collection of private in-
formation but in fact require disclosures to law enforcement in
circumstances identical to that for public housing. °0
Even more intrusively, the law requires beneficiary recipients to provide
detailed paternity information or, if paternity is unknown, to list all possible
fathers."0 2 One scholar succinctly explains as follows:
[PRWORA] specifically allows the states to vest their child support collec-
tion agencies with the administrative power to impose the following
without judicial review: orders on employers to divulge extensive infor-
mation about their employees; orders on employers, financial institutions
and governmental agencies to withhold a payer's income or to seize his/her
assets; orders on the putative biological parents and their alleged children
to submit to genetic tests; and orders on single mothers to provide the
name, address, Social Security number, driver's license number, employer,
and any other necessary identification information for the alleged father.'03
The state is, admittedly, required to take steps to safeguard information
generally, but the statute does not set any specific floor.t° And, as in the
98. Id. § 1437d(q)(6), (7).
99. Prior to the passage of PRWORA, law enforcement could obtain private infor-
mation only through the use of formal legal process. Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization
of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 668-69 (2009).
100. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(9).
102. Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare
Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 145-47, 147 n.103 (2002).
103. Id. at 147. Smith elaborates further on how child support cooperation rules affect
single mothers:
The PRWORA specifically orders each state to compel single mothers who receive wel-
fare benefits to cooperate with state agencies in establishing the paternity of their
children and in obtaining child support payments. Although similar legislation had been
in effect since the mid-1970s, the PRWORA directs the states to sanction clients who do
not cooperate, expands administrative powers, and decreases the level of judicial review.
It also weakens an important exemption: whereas previous federal law and regulations
had required states to exempt women subjected to domestic violence from child support
cooperation rules, the PRWORA has given the states the freedom to define the exemption
themselves.
Id. at 123-24 (footnotes omitted).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(I)(A)(iv). State implementation of privacy protections vary
markedly, in that some limit disclosure to purposes directly connected to the administration of
benefits whereas others are more permissive. See generally Gustafson, supra note 99, at 667-
81 (detailing sharing of welfare records with law enforcement for investigative purposes, state
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case of public housing, the law enforcement access provisions override any
contradictory state protections.10 5 They further allow the sharing of basic
information (such as name, address, and case number) with "private industry
councils," namely local groups of business leaders." 6
These provisions have been actively, not just passively, exploited by law
enforcement. For example, in the wake of these provisions' passage, federal
officials set up "Operation Talon," a program designed to mine welfare and
housing rolls to apprehend persons with outstanding warrants.0 7 Moreover,
states commonly condition receipt of welfare benefits on the provision of
sensitive personal data--data that, as the foregoing attests, is then fully open
to public officials' inspection. Eight states now require the collection of bi-
ometric information, 0 s and some impose random drug testing. 09 Lastly, the
law is unsettled as to the constitutionality of unannounced, random searches
of welfare recipients' homes,' 0and so federal privacy legislation, if any-
thing, encourages rather than forbids such searches.
Persons with criminal records, an estimated 80 to 90 percent of whom
are indigent,"'I also have virtually nonexistent federal privacy protections:
bans on food stamps or welfare for drug felons, and data sharing of identity information be-
tween welfare and criminal justice systems); Joseph T. Bockrath, Annotation, Confidentiality
of Records as to Recipients of Public Welfare, 54 A.L.R.3D 768 (1974 & Supp. 2012).
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(9)(B).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(5)(D)(ii), (J).
107. Gustafson, supra note 99, at 670-71 (adding that such measures are costly and have
not been shown to significantly reduce fraud). Between 1997 and 2006, the program has led to
the arrest of over 10,000 individuals. Id. at 671. It should be noted that it is not the case that
the capture of fugitives necessarily results in a cost savings to public programs--even if one
person was improperly enrolled in benefits, it is still the case that family members may be
eligible to continue receiving assistance. Id. This program may remind some readers of Project
Match, a 1977 program to compare welfare and employee records in order to detect fraud, and
that represented one of the first forays into data mining by the federal government. See James
P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 43
(2003).
108. Gustafson, supra note 99, at 675. There were significant debates in the 1970s over
the requirement that the Social Security number be used as a basis for obtaining benefits. See
id. at668 n.114.
109. See id. at 679-80. It should be noted that there has been some recent resistance to
mandatory drug testing for welfare recipients. See Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273
(M.D. Fla. 2011) (issuing preliminary injunction enjoining suspicionless drug testing of feder-
al welfare recipients under Florida law).
110. Compare Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (upholding warrantless, suspi-
cionless searches of homes of conditional releases), and Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309
(1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by an announced cursory visit to
the welfare recipient's home by social workers), with Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 425 P.2d
233 (Cal. 1967) (finding by California Supreme Court that random midnight raids violated the
Fourth Amendment).
11. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 179023, DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
dccc.pdf ("[A]bout 86% of those already on criminal justice status-for example, on pretrial
release, probation, or parole ... used appointed counsel."); STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J.
DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-158909, INDIGENT DEFENSE 1 (1996), available at
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"In the United States, criminal records are effectively public, either by law
or in practice."'1 2 Indeed, federal law has arguably made criminal records
more accessible. First, federal statutory law has indisputably moved to-
ward greater centralization of criminal histories, rather than sheltering
such history from public consumption.'13 As a result, whereas historically
"an individual's criminal records were not easily retrievable because a
searcher would not know which court held the relevant records[, r]ecent
statewide centralization and automation of court records systems has vast-
ly increased record identification and accessibility."" 4 Second, new federal
laws mandate that background checks be conducted for a wide range of
reasons, including for certain employment positions, which creates incen-
tives for others to begin looking for, compiling, and even selling such
records." 5 And in the absence of federal laws mandating confidentiality
protections for criminal records, there has emerged a "thriving private sec-
tor industry" aimed at providing such information to interested parties.'' 6
At most, entities providing this information are covered by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, which one expert describes as "offer[ing] very little protec-
tion for persons who have a criminal record.""' 7 Thus, not only do federal
statutes create and then provide essentially free and unfettered access to
criminal records for law enforcement personnel," 8 but they also fail to
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf (reporting 80 percent indigency rate among
those charged with felonies in the seventy-five largest counties in 1992).
112. James B. Jacobs & Dimitra Blitsa, Sharing Criminal Records: The United States,
the European Union, and Interpol Compared, 30 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 142
(2008) ("They can be obtained through three channels: (1) courts and court systems; (2) state
criminal record repositories; and (3) private companies that sell information. While the state-
level repositories and the FBI's National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) restrict access
to their criminal records, court records are open to the public as a matter of historical practice
and constitutional common law. Private information companies mostly obtain criminal record
information from courts and sell it to private customers." (footnotes omitted)).
113. James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 180-82 (2008) (describing array of
"federal funding for the improvement and expansion of state criminal record keeping" along
with federal analogues, including the National Instant Criminal Background Check System
("NICS"), the Interstate Identification Index ("II"), and the National Crime Information Cen-
ter ("NCIC"), and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("IAFIS")).
114. Id. at 183.
115. Id. at 178-79. In fact, criminal convictions are now considered relevant to a wide
range of determinations, including government benefits, voting rights, student loans, public
housing, educational programs, public licenses, and so on. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big
Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and
Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004); James
B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 387, 389-90 (2006).
116. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 113, at 185.
117. Id. at 186 n.57.
118. Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 112, at 133 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION AND PRIVACY COMPACT: RESOURCE MA-
TERIALS 2 (1998), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncppcrm.pdf
(describing the two phases of HI access, which provides nationwide criminal history
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meaningfully circumscribe access to those records by other private per-
sons.
119
In sum, not only has federal statutory law failed to provide safeguards
protecting the privacy of low-income persons, but it has actually affirmative-
ly compromised their privacy by mandating disclosure on the thinnest
showing of law enforcement need.' 20 To the extent that technology has
played a role with respect to the privacy of the poor, it has been to capitalize
on opportunities to share information, rather than to view digitalization as a
threat.
Before closing, I want to briefly anticipate some likely reservations
about these claims. First, some might expect that the government simply
protects privacy less vigorously when acting in its spending or appropria-
tions capacity, but that turns out not to be the case. Rather, many of the
federal privacy statutes currently in effect use expenditures as the hook
through which to impose baseline protections. Whether through federal
highway funding, FDIC status, or Medicare appropriations, Congress has
repeatedly chosen to enhance, not lessen, privacy coverage. Indeed, consider
one direct comparison-federal Social Security. Social Security beneficiar-
ies, who reflect a far more diverse socioeconomic profile, receive privacy
protection commensurate with other mainstream socioeconomic classes,
including checks on accuracy and notice prior to disclosure.' 2' Even recipi-
information, first for criminal justice purposes and second for both criminal and noncriminal
justice purposes). Although the compact was described as "privacy neutral," in fact it makes
criminal record information available for noncriminal justice purposes (like private employ-
ment background checks) regardless of state law. See id. at 135-36. By comparison, criminal
history information is much more difficult to obtain in Europe, as a matter of both practical
coordination and deliberate policy choice. Id. at 137-44 ("In the United States, criminal rec-
ords are effectively public, either by law or in practice.... [W]hile most EU countries make
conviction records available to judicial authorities and in some cases to police and other public
authorities, they almost never provide private individuals and entities (e.g., employers) with
another individual's criminal history record." (footnote omitted)).
119. To be sure, state laws may regulate access to or use of criminal records-for in-
stance, by sealing arrest histories or barring use of criminal records in employment
decisions-but no federal mandate requires such provisions.
120. 42 C.F.R. § 431.306 (2012) (describing federal standards for release of information,
which includes a policy to safeguard the information); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Right and
Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113 (2011) (describing highly intrusive information
gathering performed as a condition of public assistance for state prenatal care). To be clear, the
Constitution does not fare much better. Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the
Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REv. 391,401-05 (2003).
121. They are specifically covered by the Privacy Act, including the Computer Matching
and Privacy Protection Act Amendments of 1988, which otherwise does not apply to the
states. See George B. Trubow, Protecting Informational Privacy in the Information Society, 10
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 521, 526 (1990); see also infra Section I.F (describing typical access provi-
sions of federal privacy statutes). Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 states that it "shall be
unlawful for any Federal, State or local government agency to deny to any individual any
right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual's refusal to disclose his
social security account number." Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 7, 88 Stat. 1896,
1909, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 552a note at 712 (2006).
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ents of unemployment compensation122 and student loans 123 receive a bit
more protection.
Second, some might expect that the government always exploits the in-
formation that it has in its possession, so that the disproportionate exposure
of the poor is due simply to their entanglement with various federal pro-
grams. But federal income tax records are among the most protected pieces
of personal information; laws strictly circumscribe law enforcement access
to tax records.12 4 And even though the Privacy Act is significantly broader,
with many avenues for law enforcement to obtain information from federal
agencies, 25 it still does not go so far as to mandate divulgence of infor-
mation, much less in such detail. Nor does Congress restrict its reach in
deference to federalist principles: privacy statutes address such classic state
tasks as driver's licensing and even highly localized activities like education
or cable-services provision.
Moreover, these provisions cannot be explained as the simple result of
congressional efforts to stamp out fraud or crime. To the extent that the gov-
ernment has a strong financial stake in social benefit programs, the majority
122. 20 C.F.R. § 603.5(e) (2012) (allowing "[d]isclosure of confidential UC information
to a public official for use in the performance of his or her official duties"); id. § 603.7(b)(2)
(allowing such disclosure "without the actual issuance of a subpoena"). This protection is
slightly greater in that it also includes provisions for safeguarding further disclosures. Id.
§ 603.9 (imposing requirement that states require "recipient to safeguard the information dis-
closed against unauthorized access or redisclosure" through storage, processing, and other
precautionary guarantees).
123. See 34 C.F.R. § 5b.9(b)(7) (2012) (allowing such disclosure to a government agency
without consent if "the activity is authorized by law, and if the.., agency ... has submitted a
written request ... specifying the record desired and the law enforcement activity for which
the record is sought").
124. See I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1) (2006) (allowing disclosure to enforce tax laws); id.
§ 6103(h)(4)(D) (authorizing disclosure by court order, if the court gave "due consideration to
congressional policy favoring the confidentiality of returns and return information as set forth
in this title"); id. § 6103(i) (allowing access for law enforcement, enforcing nontax laws, via
ex parte court order following specified criteria). See generally Agnes Gesiko, The Protection
of Taxpayer's [sic] Federal Tax Return Information in the Internet Age-Is Tax Return Infor-
mation Being Afforded Proper Confidentiality and Privacy Protections?, 62 TAX LAW. 175
(2008) (detailing authorized disclosures and noting strict policies limiting transfer of covered
material, requiring destruction or return after use, and imposing criminal and civil penalties on
violators).
125. Critics note that the "routine use" exception is a "gigantic loophole." Solove, supra
note 35, at 1167. And the Act has "been eroded by about a dozen exceptions. For example,
agencies can disclose information without the consent of individuals to the Census Bureau,
law enforcement entities, Congress, and consumer reporting agencies .... Nor does the Priva-
cy Act apply to court records." Id. at 1167 (footnote omitted). Along these lines, it should be
noted that the FBI recently announced that it intended to create a "data warehouse" that con-
solidated a number of diverse record sources (for example from the Departments of Defense,
Energy, Homeland Security, State, and Treasury, as well as from public sources), Privacy Act
of 1974, System of Records, 77 Fed. Reg. 40,630 (July 10, 2012) http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-07-10/pdf/2012-16823.pdf. It then announced that this database would be
exempt from Privacy Act protection pursuant to the law enforcement exemption. Privacy Act
of 1974: Implementation, 77 Fed. Reg. 61,275 (Oct. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. Part
16), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-10-09/pdf/2012-24753.pdf.
February 20131
514 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 111:485
of its investment goes to Social Security and Medicare, not means-tested
public assistance. And, of course, the government's absolute stake in spend-
ing is small; in 2011, roughly 13% of the federal budget was allocated to
safety net programs, 126 whereas medical benefits consumed 21% and Social
Security 20%.27 To the extent that these provisions might be excused as
helping to police crime generally, it is notable that even driver's license in-
formation receives more protection in that disclosures to law enforcement
are mandated only in connection with motor vehicle offenses and states are
affirmatively limited in their ability to sell information without the driver's
consent. 28 Indeed, to the extent that stopping crime generally is a concern, it
is worth noting that Congress has affirmatively blocked the creation of-
much less moved to compile-one potentially powerful tool: a weapons
database. 29
Nor is it the case that Congress has responded with federal legislation
only in areas in which the government itself has some special role in gener-
ating, or seeking, the information that might be exposed. Government has no
direct role in video rentals and cable provision, an indirect role in healthcare
and financial services, and a direct role in education and licensing, and yet
all of these areas have received targeted privacy protections. Similarly, alt-
hough some material would likely appeal more to the private or public
sector, the statutes reveal no particular tendency to shelter information from
the prying eyes of one or the other. In short, it is not as though only one kind
of privacy threat can lay claim to congressional interest-the statutes cover
everything from private information for private gain to private information
for public gain to public disclosure for public gain and public disclosure for
private gain.
126. Such programs include the following:
[T]he refundable portion of the eamed-income and child tax credits, which assist low-
and moderate-income working families through the tax code; programs that provide cash
payments to eligible individuals or households, including Supplemental Security Income
for the elderly or disabled poor and unemployment insurance; various forms of in-kind
assistance for low-income families and individuals, including food stamps, school meals,
low-income housing assistance, child-care assistance, and assistance in meeting home
energy bills; and various other programs such as those that aid abused and neglected
children.
Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIOR-
ITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1258 (last updated Aug. 13, 2012).
127. Id.
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (2006) (obligating disclosure for motor vehicle-related
matters, but simply allowing it under other circumstances).
129. Id. § 926(a). To the extent that this might be explained as a function of the Second
Amendment or federalist concerns, it is important to remember that housing and welfare both
implicate constitutional values-such as intimate association or family welfare-and also are
traditionally state interests.
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F. Law Enforcement Access Provisions Preference Subpoenas over
Warrants, and Regulate Not Just Acquisition but Also Use
Even recognizing that federal statutes do not just fail to safeguard but
actually affirmatively undermine the privacy of the poor with regard to law
enforcement, the amount of protection they accord to mainstream interests
should not be overstated. Law enforcement exemptions in privacy statutes
exhibit a wide range of variation. Some impose intricate requirements, while
others provide more vaguely defined standards for access. Interestingly, the
variation does not seem to follow any intuitive scaling of protections. 30 That
is, it is not the case that the areas in which most individuals likely expect the
greatest privacy correspond to the strictest statutory standards for access."'
For example, it has been observed that there are greater protections for cable
records than there are for health records. 32
Despite wide variation, some general tendencies about law enforcement
access can be gleaned. Specifically, with regard to domestic law enforce-
ment access, federal privacy statutes (1) typically allow access pursuant to a
standard less than the constitutional default, which is a warrant and probable
cause; (2) demonstrate a strong preference for the use of subpoenas, alt-
hough they often impose additional requirements on the use, transfer, and
disposal of information that exceed those mandated by the Constitution; and
(3) show a strong preference for advance notice to the individual, when rele-
vant, although they also often contain provisions to delay or circumvent that
notice requirement.
Only two privacy statutes condition access for law enforcement using
the traditional requirement of a warrant and probable cause, and both of
them are constitutionally required to do so. Specifically, Title III imposes a
probable cause and highly particularized warrant standard, 13 3 and the PPA
restricts (beyond constitutional levels) what information law enforcement
can seize from the press and when.13 4 But these statutes are atypical. Every
130. See infra notes 124-125 and accompanying text. But see supra Part I.D (suggesting
that law enforcement's interest in the regulated material may influence the scope of protec-
tion).
131. SLOBOoIN, supra note 14, at 184 (reporting survey results on perceived intrusive-
ness of various investigative behaviors); SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 28, at 442 ("Other
federal privacy statutes generally provide stronger protection for third-party records than does
the HIPAA rule."). Similarly, education records get more protection than bank records.
132. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 28, at 442.
133. Arguably, the CCPA provides greater restrictions as well, in that it sets out a re-
quirement of "clear and convincing evidence" as opposed to mere probable cause. 47 U.S.C.
§ 551(h)(1) (2006). However, the CCPA was amended by the USA PATRIOT Act to ease
access for communications provided through a cable company, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 211, 115
Stat. 272, 283-84 (2001), even though other information remains difficult to access.
134. Each responded to the Court, but in different ways: Title Ill was enacted in response
to the Supreme Court's findings in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), that there was a
legitimate expectation of privacy in a phone conversation, and in Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78 (1935), that the particularity requirement demanded more than a blanket warrant to
authorize a wiretap. The PPA was enacted in response to the Court's opinion in Zurcher v.
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other federal privacy statute, in contrast, allows disclosures based on a war-
rant and probable cause, but also permits access upon lesser showings, most
commonly a court order or a judicial, grand jury, or administrative subpoe-
na.1
35
In fact, the statutes demonstrate a near-universal preference for the judi-
cial subpoena as the baseline for access. It might be argued that a number of
statutes depart significantly from this general rule, in that they allow access
pursuant to an administrative subpoena or request.1 36 For instance, the RFPA
allows access based only on written request, assuming no more formal pro-
cess is available. 137 HIPAA likewise provides for an administrative request
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), which refused to heighten protection for the press. See
generally Bellia, supra note 14, at 300, 309 n.73.
135. There are arguably two exceptions to this rule. First, the Stored Communications
Act requires a warrant for a subset of covered material-namely, to compel disclosure of uno-
pened emails in storage for fewer than 180 days. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
Second, there are a handful of statutes that contain language stating simply that they do not
prohibit any "lawful law enforcement ... activity," without specifying what that might in-
clude. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2006).
136. Administrative subpoenas are regularly issued by federal agencies seeking to
compel the production of testimony or documents in order to execute either an adjudicative
or investigative administrative function. The authority to issue such subpoenas derives from
statutory grants of power that typically also prescribe its precise scope. CHARLES DOYLE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22407, ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS: A SKETCH, at CRS-2 (2006). In the past thirty or so years, the power to issue
administrative process in connection with criminal investigations has steadily broadened.
Id. at CRS-3. The earliest statute allowed the Attorney General to issue subpoenas in con-
nection with her duties to police controlled substances, Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 506(a)-(c), 84 Stat. 1236, 1272-
73 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 876 (2006)); then the Inspector General Act of 1978
bestowed similar power on an authorized Inspector General, Pub. L. No. 95-452, § 6(a)(4),
92 Stat. 1101, 1104 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V
2011)). The power now covers criminal investigations as diverse as health care fraud, child
abuse, and threats against the president. 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). This
provision of HIPAA was the first to clearly be intended for use in criminal investigations,
and unlike its predecessors, it is more protective in its terms. See DOYLE, supra, at CRS-3
to CRS-4 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3486, the administrative subpoena provision added by
HIPAA). The War on Terror has revived interest in administrative subpoenas, Risa Berkow-
er, Note, Sliding Down a Slippery Slope? The Future Use of Administrative Subpoenas in
Criminal Investigations, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2251, 2252, 2270-71 (2005), and Congress
has taken up the issue several times recently, see, e.g., S. 2555, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.
3037, 108th Cong. (2003). See generally Berkower, supra.
137. 12 U.S.C. § 3408 (2006). Pursuant to the statute, written requests may be made
only where (1) "no administrative summons or subpena [sic] authority reasonably appears to
be available to that Government authority"; (2) agency regulations authorize it; (3) the sought
material is "relevant to a legitimate law enforcement authority"; and (4) the notice-and-
challenge provisions are followed. Id. Thus, it simply allows law enforcement to "request" the
information-it does not compel the institution to turn it over. Compare id. ("Government
authority may request .... "), with id. §§ 3405-3407 ("Government authority may obtain
.... "). Again, I underscore here that my focus is on domestic criminal law enforcement; pur-
suant to the USA PATRIOT Act, national security letters-initially a fairly circumscribed tool
found in the RFPA and ECPA-are now available in a much broader array of situations. Pub.
L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272, 365-66 (2001). Thus, although facially this provision
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option, with a lesser standard than that required for subpoenas, orders, or
warrants. 138 The DPPA allows disclosure of highly restricted personal in-
formation for use by "any court or law enforcement agency[] in carrying out
its functions," without specifying whether any legal process is required. 3 9
FCRA allows access to identifying information (such as name, former and
current addresses, and employment history) upon request. 4 ° COPPA allows
collection, use, and disclosure of information of child interet users without
parental consent in cases where "to the extent permitted under other provi-
sions of law," doing so "provide[s] information to law enforcement agencies
or for an investigation on a matter related to public safety."'' The Privacy
Act permits disclosure for "criminal law enforcement activity if the activity
is authorized by law, and if the head ... has made a written request to the
agency .... ,142
But in all of these instances, the disclosure is optional: the entity may dis-
close the requested information but disclosure is not compelled by law.143 In
order to compel the disclosure of information to law enforcement, the majori-
ty of statutes require at minimum a subpoena or court order.'44 Of course,
may appear to expand authority dramatically, in reality it may be the case that it is invoked
only in unusual or exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Jones v. Dept. of Air Force, 947 F.
Supp. 1507, 1512-14 (D. Colo. 1996) (finding that Air Force investigators' use of written
request exception was proper, because, inter alia, although inspector general had administra-
tive subpoena authority, at the time of investigation it was limited by policy to dollar amounts
seemingly in excess of those at issue in fraud case). See generally Richard Cordero, Annota-
tion, Construction and Application of Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 112 A.L.R. FED.
295 (1993) (referring to section 3408 in only one small entry).
138. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(ii)(C) (2012). There are also provisions for specific law
enforcement needs, like locating fugitives or missing persons, reporting victim's conditions in
emergencies, reporting possible homicides, reporting crimes on the premises, or other emer-
gencies. See id.
139. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721(b)(1), 2725(4) (2006) (describing highly restricted personal
information to include photographs, Social Security number, and medical or disability infor-
mation). Personal information (identifying information, including Social Security number and
photographs) shall be disclosed in relation to motor vehicle safety and theft functions. Id.
§ 2721(b).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 168If (2006).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(2)(E)(iv). COPPA also permits disclosure "to respond to judi-
cial process." Id. § 6502(b)(2)(E)(iii).
142. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7) (2006).
143. The optional nature of compliance allows proponents of administrative subpoena
authority to view it as simply allowing the government to bypass cumbersome procedures to
obtain information that already is routinely accessed using grand jury subpoenas. However,
opponents view it as an end run around the probable cause, particularity, and neutrality stand-
ards embodied by the Fourth Amendment, and warn against expanding the categories beyond
narrow fields in which limited records would prove relevant (for instance "health fraud" versus
"any fraud"). See, e.g., Jameel Jaffer, Panel Report: Secret Evidence in the Investigative Stage:
FISA, Administrative Subpoenas, and Privacy, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 7
(2006).
144. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(1); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B) (2006). See general-
ly FED. R. CRIM. P. 617; Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 E Supp. 2d 471, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated
per curiam sub nom. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
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normally one would consider a subpoena a lesser threshold of security than a
warrant. Judicial subpoenas are typically issued in connection with an investi-
gation or proceeding, pursuant to statutory or other investigative authority, and
are limited only by jurisdictional reach and a requirement that they not be
"unreasonable or oppressive.' 1 45 In the federal context, they are commonly
issued by grand juries investigating criminal matters; although if a case is
pending before a court, the parties may have power to issue subpoenas under
the federal rules or, in the case of the criminal defendant, the Sixth Amend-
ment Compulsory Process Clause. 146 Regardless of the issuer, they are
typically issued unilaterally, on a showing of mere relevance, and require nei-
ther notice to the opposing party nor permission of a court.'47 In general,
subpoenas are thus considered fairly permissive and powerful access tools. 1
48
Similarly, court orders necessitate judicial permission and a pending matter,
but are normally available upon only a relevance showing.
But the reliance on devices other than a warrant requirement may offer
greater protection for privacy than appears at first glance. Federal statutes
often impose additional procedural protections-such as heightened proof
thresholds, advance notice, and use restrictions-that exceed the basic prob-
able cause standard applicable to an ordinary warrant. For example, the
CCPA requires that the court order be based upon "clear and convincing
evidence that the subject of the information is reasonably suspected of en-
gaging in criminal activity and that the information sought would be
145. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). Significantly, the Supreme Court adapts these standards
according to context. It has thus limited trial subpoenas by three requirements: "(1) relevancy;
(2) admissibility; [and] (3) specificity." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974).
In contrast, grand jury subpoenas will be quashed only upon a challenger's showing that there
is "no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce
information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's investigation.' United States v.
R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).
146. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. CRIM P. 17; see also United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950) ("The judicial subpoena power not only is subject to spe-
cific constitutional limitations, which also apply to administrative orders, such as those against
self-incrimination, unreasonable search and seizure, and due process of law, but also is subject
to those limitations inherent in the body that issues them because of the provisions of the Judi-
ciary Article of the Constitution."); Nixon v. Sirica (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 487 F.2d
700, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[Jludicial subpoenas seek information in aid of the power to adju-
dicate controversies between individual litigants in a single civil or criminal case.").
147. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17; R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. at 296-300 (referencing subpoena
process and relevancy standard for trial and grand jury subpoenas). Many statutes also author-
ize law enforcement access via a court order, but a court order is by its nature almost always a
higher threshold than a subpoena because it requires the express approval of a judicial official.
However, because an investigator can petition a court for an order even in the absence of an
ongoing formal proceeding or grand jury investigation, it might in some cases be a preferable
vehicle for obtaining information.
148. At the same time, we might expect that a judicial subpoena is narrower than either a
grand jury or administrative subpoena in that it is issued in connection with a pending matter
(rather than an investigation) and is overseen by a judicial officer.
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material in the case."'149 Like a warrant, a court order must be granted by a
neutral magistrate, but the clear and convincing standard exceeds the war-
rant's probable cause standard, just as the requirement of materiality
arguably does.' The VPPA requires that court orders be based on probable
cause, which would appear to mirror the warrant requirement. 5 ' The IRS
Code requires that, for non-tax-related investigations, the court order man-
date disclosure only to federal law enforcement if there is "reasonable cause
to believe, based on information believed to be reliable, that a specific crim-
inal act has been committed" as well as "reasonable cause to believe that the
return ... may be relevant to a matter relating to the commission of such
act," and the return "is sought exclusively for use in a Federal criminal in-
vestigation or proceeding concerning such act, and the information ...
cannot reasonably be obtained... from another source."' 52 This "last resort"
element represents another departure from constitutional practice, which
imposes no requirement that law enforcement attempt to obtain information
in a less intrusive fashion before seeking a warrant. In short, although "sub-
poena" or "court order" seems to be the threshold, the proof requirements
often track or even exceed those necessary to secure a Fourth Amendment
warrant.
Moreover, with regard to subpoenas, the most common additional re-
quirement is that prior notice be given to the affected individual that the
information is sought. Thus, for example, the RFPA, 53 CPPA,1
54 VPPA, 55
149. 47 U.S.C. § 551(h)(1) (2006). For cable companies that provide phone or internet
access, information is available, not including subscriber programming selections, pursuant to
Title III, SCA, and the Pen Register Act. See id. § 551(c)(2)(D).
150. Whether it is in fact a higher standard likely turns on whether the statutory terms,
which require a showing that "the subject of the information is reasonably suspected of engag-
ing in criminal activity and that the information sought would be material evidence in the
case," id. § 551(h)(1), comport with or exceed the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3) (2006). Again, it is hard to know how to square a court-
order provision, requiring probable cause, with a warrant requirement. The VPPA allows
access pursuant to a warrant as well as a court order, see id. § 2710(b)(2)(C), implying some
distinction between the two. It may be that the only difference is that court orders are available
for civil and not just criminal matters.
152. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(l)(B) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(i)-l (2012). Disclo-
sure is permitted to state law enforcement agents only for tax offense purposes, I.R.C.
§ 6103(d), and other limited reasons, see, e.g., id. § 6103(l)(6) (child support enforcement); id.
§ 6103(l)(7) (benefits programs), while disclosures to federal officials for tax-related offenses
do not require judicial process at all, id. § 6103(h).
153. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3405(2), 3406(b), 3407(2), 3408(4)(A) (2006). The statute was
amended repeatedly to restrict the notice requirement or allow for delays, such that, for in-
stance, notice to grand jury targets is now forbidden. Id. § 3420(b)(1).
154. 47 U.S.C. § 551(h)(2) (requiring that an individual be given "the opportunity to
appear and contest such entity's claim"). It also more generally requires prior written consent
for disclosure, subject to a handful of exceptions. id. § 551(c)(1).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(C), (3) (requiring that all court orders issue "only with prior




FERPA, 156 and PPA 57 all require notice of some kind. Of course, notice is
particularly significant with regard to these statutes because nearly all of
them cover information held by third parties, and thus disclosure could oth-
erwise occur without the knowledge of the affected person. Nevertheless,
the notice requirement is not universal. HIPAA, 55 the Privacy Act,159 and the
DPPA 6° lift an otherwise general notice requirement for its authorized law
enforcement disclosures, and many of the statutes supply the government
with an avenue for requesting a delay of notice or withholding notice alto-
gether. I6I
The final way in which federal privacy statutes regularly exceed consti-
tutional standards is that they constrain not just the acquisition of material
but also its use. For instance, the RFPA strictly regulates the transfer of law-
fully obtained financial records, circumscribing their permissible use even in
the grand jury and requiring notice to the customer upon transfer.162 The
RFPA's barriers around use and transfer were replicated in subsequent en-
actments. By way of additional examples, the VPPA provides for destruction
of records 163 and encourages "appropriate safeguards against unauthorized
disclosure" for any material accessed through compelled disclosure. 164 The
DPPA limits resale or redisclosure of lawfully obtained information, mainly
for those uses already permitted by statute. 65 FERPA requires written certi-
fication from juvenile justice authorities before disclosure, 166 and further
allows the institution to deny access to third parties found to be too lax in
redisclosing.' 67 The CCPA even requires destruction of information if it is
156. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) (2006). FERPA also segregates "law enforcement records,"
which are those created separate from education records and maintained for law enforcement
purposes only, and allows them to be accessed only by law enforcement officials of the same
jurisdiction. Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii). It also has a special provision for state juvenile justice
actors, id. § 1232g(b)(1)(E), and designees of the Attorney General monitoring such programs,
id. § 1232g(b)(1)(C).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(c) (2006).
158. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2012).
159. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7) (2006); id. § 552a(c)(3) (requiring that law enforcement
requests follow general rule requiring accurate accounting of disclosures for five years, but not
requiring disclosures be available to the affected person).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(2).
161. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3409 (2006) (RFPA); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(l)(J) (FERPA).
162. As Congressman John LaFalce stated in opposition to those provisions, "Restricting
the use of lawfully acquired information to the original purpose for which it was obtained is
contrary to established legal principles found both in case law and the Privacy Act of 1974.
The generally applicable rule is that, once the privacy interest in records has been legitimately
breached ... unanticipated information in such records .. . may be used by law enforcement
authorities." H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, at 212 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273,
9343.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 27 10(e) (2006).
164. Id. § 2710(b)(2).
165. Id. § 2721(c).
166. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(l)(E)(ii)(II).
167. Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 § 249, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4)(B).
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"no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected and there are
no pending requests or orders for access.' '1 68
In sum, although privacy statutes at first blush appear to lower the stand-
ard for law enforcement access to covered materials by infrequently
imposing a warrant or probable cause requirement, in significant respects
they offer greater protection from intrusion in that they may raise proof
thresholds, require advance notice of disclosure, restrict subsequent transfer
or use, and mandate destruction of records.
In fact, statutory provisions for grand jury, administrative, or judicial
subpoenas also afford more protection than does a standard subpoena under
the Fourth Amendment because subpoenas in general have been accorded
only the barest protection, even when a Fourth Amendment interest is impli-
cated. 169 Moreover, the Supreme Court has defined the "reasonableness"
standards for subpoenas broadly, rarely invalidating a law enforcement re-
quest.11' Accordingly, although the RFPA subpoena provisions clearly fall
well below the warrant and probable cause requirement, they are more or
less consonant with the lesser "reasonableness" and "relevance"
168. 47 U.S.C. § 551(e) (2006).
169. The constitutional law governing the acquisition of evidence through a subpoena
duces tecum stands somewhat in opposition to the law governing the acquisition of evidence
through physical search and seizure. Whereas a search is governed by Fourth Amendment law,
with minimal to nonexistent Fifth Amendment protection, a subpoena is largely regulated
through the Fifth Amendment and left only lightly regulated by the Fourth Amendment. See
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (holding that the Fifth Amendment was not im-
plicated, and the Fourth Amendment not violated, by search warrant resulting in seizure of
business documents); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-76 (1906) (holding that Fourth
Amendment did not automatically prohibit subpoena duces tecum issued to corporate officer,
but invalidating issued subpoena as unreasonably broad). The Court has not wholly disclaimed
application of the Fourth Amendment to subpoena processes; those cases suggest that only the
barest regulation applies. However, one source of uncertainty lies in the fact that most cases
involve the subpoena or seizure of business, and not personal, documents:
Without attempting to summarize or accurately distinguish all of the cases, the fair distil-
lation, in so far as they apply merely to the production of corporate records and papers in
response to a subpoena or order authorized by law and safeguarded by judicial sanction,
seems to be that the Fifth Amendment affords no protection by virtue of the self-
incrimination provision, whether for the corporation or for its officers; and the Fourth, if
applicable, at the most guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or
breadth in the things required to be 'particularly described,' if also the inquiry is one the
demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials specified are relevant.
The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure
sought shall not be unreasonable.
Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946).
170. 2 WAYNE LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.13(a) (4th ed. 2004) ("Although the
Supreme Court has stated in dicta that the Fourth Amendment continues to limit the subpoena
power of the government, the Court has rejected Fourth Amendment objections to subpoenas
in every case it has decided in modern times."). The Fifth Amendment only comes into play
for personal papers sought from the suspect herself, which while not themselves protected,
may be protected from compelled production. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984)




requirements generally governing subpoenas for constitutionally protected
information.1 71 More importantly, the RFPA provides additional procedural
protections beyond the Fourth Amendment standard because in most cases
the statute imposes notice, use, and transfer restrictions of lawfully obtained
records. 
1 72
G. Available Remedies in the Event of Violation Differ from the
Constitutional Standard of Evidentiary Exclusion
Another significant distinction between statutory and constitutional reg-
ulation of privacy can be found in the remedies available upon violation,
which depart from the customary exclusionary rule. Only two statutes pro-
vide for exclusion of evidence as a remedy for violations: Title III and the
VPPA.173 Of course, the exclusionary rule was effectively mandated as re-
gards Title III, because Katz v. United States and Berger v. New York had
already made it clear that improper wiretapping violated the Constitution.
1 74
As for the VPPA, the legislative record does not clearly reveal why it
includes an exclusionary remedy. One possibility is that much of the
testimony before the committee included examples of law enforcement
171. See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967); United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (administrative subpoena by IRS did not require probable cause stand-
ard); Walling, 327 U.S. at 208-09 (setting out general standard of reasonableness for
administrative subpoena and specifically rejecting requirements that particular crime be
charged, probable cause exist, or there be narrowest precision in scope of request); see also
United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 298 (1991); United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632, 641-42 (1950) (distinguishing judicial subpoena power, which "extends only to
adjudication of cases and controversies and ... [whose] investigative powers should be jeal-
ously confined to these ends," from administrative subpoena, which has more inquisitorial
power). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also require that grand jury subpoenas not
be "unreasonable or oppressive." FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2).
172. Cf SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1984) (holding that the
Securities and Exchange Commission target was not entitled to notice of issuance of third-
party administrative subpoenas and affirming that Powell governs judicial enforceability of
administrative subpoenas and requires that the administrative entity had a "legitimate purpose
in issuing the subpoenas, that the requested information was relevant and was not already in
the Commission's possession, and that the issuance of the subpoenas comported with pertinent
procedural requirements"). However, it should be observed that subsequent amendments have
focused largely on modifying various notification provisions, both to prohibit the financial
institution from notifying customers whose records are sought, and to permit the government
to delay fulfilling its statutory notice obligations. See Berta Esperanza Herndndez, RIP to
IRP-Money Laundering and Drug Trafficking Controls Score a Knockout Victory over Bank
Secrecy, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 235, 246 n.78 (1993).
173. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2710(d) (2006). Of course, the Title III exclusionary rule ap-
plies only to oral and wire communications; electronic communications are exempted.
Notably, the exclusionary provision is actually broader than the constitutional remedy in that it
applies to interceptions by private, not just government, actors. See Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the
"Fog" of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime
Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 837 n.154 (2003).
174. And, of course, per Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), constitutional violations require exclusion of evidence.
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making what were considered abusive demands for information. A more
cynical explanation may be that the hearings represented the rare instance in
which law enforcement's interests were underrepresented: the FBI failed to
submit comments on the proposed legislation and the DOJ's comments did
not speak to remedies. 75
The remaining statutes at best give exclusion of evidence secondary
consideration. A couple of statutes arguably permit exclusion by allowing,
in the language of the CPPA, "any other lawful remedy available"1 76 with-
out mentioning suppression expressly, but that seems contingent upon a
finding of a constitutional violation. Other statutes imply disallowance of
exclusion of evidence as a remedy, such as through a provision that de-
scribes a variety of "exclusive" remedies that do not include suppression.
Language of that variety can be found in the RFPA, 177 SCA, 17 8 and PPA.
179
Several statutes expressly prohibit the exclusion of improperly obtained
evidence. 180
Finally, many statutes are altogether silent on the question of additional
remedies, including HIPAA, FERPA, COPPA, DNA, DPPA, FCRA, and the
IRS Code. Naturally, litigants have argued that this silence allows for appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule. For example, defendants have cited HIPAA
regulations' explicit reference to the Fourth Amendment, along with the
intimate nature of the covered material, as support for exclusion of evidence
as a remedy for privacy violations by law enforcement. 181 However, most
courts have rejected that contention. 182 The same kinds of arguments have
175. See, e.g., supra note 84.
176. E.g.,47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(3) (2006).
177. t2 U.S.C. § 3417(d) (2006) ("The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter
shall be the only authorized judicial remedies and sanctions for violations of this chapter.");
see, e.g., United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1986).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2006) ("The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are
the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter:"). The
Pen Register Act has also been interpreted to reject exclusion, see, e.g., United States v.
Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249 (11 th Cir. 1991).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(d) (2006).
180. In addition, the language prescribing a statutory exclusionary remedy is of particu-
lar importance because violations of state constitutional law do not necessarily require
suppression of evidence in federal court, whereas a federal statute can effectively bar introduc-
tion of evidence in any court. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Exclusion of Evidence in Federal
Prosecutions on the Basis of State Law, 22 GA. L. REv. 667, 713 (1988) (noting that although
"silver platter doctrine" and Mapp forbid introduction of evidence seized unlawfully under the
Fourth Amendment, regardless of court or seizing officer, most circuits have interpreted Elkins
as allowing introduction of evidence in federal court seized only in violation of state law).
181. See, e.g., Steven House, DWI, CHAMPION, Aug. 2007, at 46, 50.
182. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 676 F. Supp. 2d 431, 439 (D. Md. 2009); State v.
Mubita, 188 P.3d 867, 874 (Idaho 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Al-
phonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 165 P.3d 502 (Idaho 2011).
Michigan Law Review
also been raised and rejected with regard to claims made under FERPA,'83
the DNA Act, 184 FCRA, 185 the Privacy Act, 186 and the IRS Code.187
Instead, federal privacy statutes seem to show a strong preference for
civil remedies. There exists such diversity among these liability provisions
that they defy generalization. It is likewise difficult to judge how well they
work, either as a deterrent to violations or as restitution to those harmed.
Instead, I will say only that effective civil enforcement requires a party to
surmount a variety of hurdles. First, many statutes limit liability to willful or
deliberate violations of their terms, and therefore fail to provide a remedy
for the likely more common occurrence of negligent or reckless disclosure
to law enforcement. 8 8 Second, damages awards under the statutes may be
negligible, given that punitive damages-if authorized-tend to apply only
to willful violations, and disclosures of sensitive personal information can
be difficult to value monetarily (especially if the consequence of such dis-
closure is apprehension of a criminal). 189 Third, many statutes provide a
good-faith defense for actors behaving in perceived compliance with the
statute's terms, including broad provisions that essentially allow full reli-
ance on law enforcement's interpretation of the statute. 190 Fourth, recovery
can be hampered by various doctrines of immunity,' 9' coupled with statutory
183. See, e.g., United States v. Bunnell, No. CRIM.02-13-B-S, 2002 WL 981457, at *4
(D. Me. May 10, 2002).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630, 663 (D. Md. 2009), aff'd, 690
F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Edgar, 82 F.3d 499 (1st Cir. 1996).
186. Cf Word v. United States, 604 F.2d 1127, 1129-30 (8th Cir. 1979).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Orlando, 281 E3d 586, 596 (6th Cir. 2002) ("The exclu-
sionary rule is therefore inapplicable to the present case, because any purported violation of
§ 6103 did not infringe upon Daniels's constitutional rights."); Nowicki v. Comm'r, 262 F.3d
1162, 1164 (11 th Cir. 2001); United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042, 1046-48 (9th Cir.
1986); Marvin v. United States, 732 F.2d 669, 672-73 (8th Cir. 1984).
188. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2712(a) (2006) (civil remedy for willful violations of both
SCA and certain provisions of FISA).
189. See, e.g., Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004) (holding that the Privacy Act allows
recovery for only actual damages, and therefore denying $1,000 award to claimant who suc-
cessfully showed that Department of Labor improperly disclosed Social Security number). But
see, e.g., Duncan v. Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1987) (authorizing recovery of damages
without proof of actual damages under RFPA).
190. E.g., Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2529(d); RFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 3417(c); PPA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000aa-6(b). Courts may also interpret law enforcement reliance on statutory provisions
later ruled unconstitutional to constitute "good faith" and thus preclude recovery. See, e.g.,
United States v. Graham, 846 F Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012) (holding that even if police ac-
quisition of cell-site data were unconstitutional, police acted in good-faith reliance on SCA).
191. A range of immunity doctrines can impede recovery. Suits against the government
require either a federal cause of action (like section 1983 or Bivens) or a state analogue. A
state may have sovereign immunity, and a locality's immunity can be limited by requirements
that plaintiffs show a policy, custom, or failure to train with deliberate indifference. Suits
against persons in their official capacity raise the specter of qualified immunity if their actions
did not, at the time, violate clearly established law. However, it should be noted that federal
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limitations (although they appear less often than one might expect), on the
ability to sue law enforcement actors, rather than just the entity making the
disclosure.192 At least one statute allows for a private action against the
agency, but limits the liability of willfully offending government employees
to disciplinary action within the civil service system.' 93 Fifth, some stat-
utes-like FERPA, HIPAA, and COPPA---do not provide for a private right
of action, but rather depend entirely on public enforcement, 194 and advocates
have complained that authorities have been lax.95 Finally, it is worth noting
that a handful of statutes provide for criminal penalties for violations,196 but
an almost equal number do not.'97
H. Accountability and Transparency Mechanisms
May Be More Readily Available
To the extent that the Fourth Amendment holds law enforcement ac-
countable or renders its abuses transparent, it is largely through the
privacy statutes may at times serve as the basis for a claim raised under state law, even where
federal law might be unavailing.
192. E.g., Daniel v. Cantrell, 375 F.3d 377, 383-84 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing VPPA-
based claims against law enforcement officers who obtained video rental records, noting that
statute allowed recovery against only the video rental providers). Of course, such a provision
particularly matters in the absence of an exclusionary rule, since a defendant whose infor-
mation is improperly disclosed by a third party relying on law enforcement representations
may have neither a route for civil redress (due to the third party's good-faith defense, and the
lack of a cause of action against the officer) nor one for criminal redress (because the exclu-
sionary rule does not apply).
193. E.g., RFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 3417(b).
194. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 § 1306, 15 U.S.C. § 6505 (2006)
(no private right of action under COPPA); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276-91
(2002) (FERPA does not give rise to private right of action); Accara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569
(5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (no private cause of action under HIPAA).
195. See, e.g., SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 28, at 439-40 (describing lack of any
enforcement actions in first three years of HIPAA); Solove, supra note 35, at 1168-69 ("Alt-
hough the Privacy Act requires an individual's permission before his or her records can be
disclosed, redress for violations of the Act is virtually impossible to obtain."). The Department
of Health and Human Services now maintains a website that highlights its enforcement efforts,
which have significantly increased. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Health
Information Privacy, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
196. E.g., Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i) (2006); Fair Credit Reporting Act § 619,
15 U.S.C. § 1681q; Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(2006); id. § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (Stored Communications Act); Driver's Privacy Protection
Act of 1994 § 300002(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2723; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 § 262(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 42 U.S.C. § 14135e
(2006).
197. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 § 1117, 12 U.S.C. § 3417; 15 U.S.C. § 6504;
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006); 20 U.S.C. § 12g (2006); Privacy Protection Act of 1980 § 106, 42
U.S.C. § 2000aa-6 (2006). Most of those statutes providing liability grade the offense as a
misdemeanor, at times imposing only monetary fines without threat of imprisonment. E.g., 5
U.S.C. § 552a(i); 18 U.S.C. § 2723. In addition, some of the internal standards are tautologi-
cal-for instance, requiring "unauthorized uses" without specifying more precisely what
"authorized" uses would be.
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exclusionary rule.' 98 So given that legislators seem to disfavor the exclu-
sionary rule, are there other means through which they secure compliance?
Examination of privacy laws reveals strengths, such as the imposition of
heightened transparency and recordkeeping requirements, as well as weak-
nesses, in the form of lack of accountability.
First, of course, statutes may impose civil, criminal, and administrative
penalties for violations. But as the previous Section explains, such remedies
do not always serve an accountability or deterrent function, due to the im-
probability of successful judgment or recovery. Second, although the notice
requirements contained in the majority of federal statutes might suggest that
a record is generated whenever a party lodges a request (whether a written
letter, subpoena of some kind, or court order), which then might be ampli-
fied by any resulting proceedings, in reality it can be difficult to aggregate
such information in the absence of a specific directive to do so. Thus, while
there might in the abstract be a paper trail of administrative subpoenas is-
sued pursuant to the VPPA, and a concomitant record of any related judicial
challenges or hearings, such information is virtually impossible to assess
comprehensively.
Third, federal privacy statutes show no consistent commitment to ensur-
ing structural reform or systemic change, which can be difficult to achieve
through individualized remedies.199 As Paul Schwartz noted, for example,
"The Privacy Act does not give federal courts the power to order agencies to
change their data processing practices. ' 200 To be sure, there are some excep-
tions: the DPPA authorizes imposition of a daily fine of $5,000 on a DMV
office shown to have a policy or practice of noncompliance, 0 ' and HIPAA,
FERPA, and the DNA Act all (at least in theory) condition benefits on evi-
dence of structural compliance. 20 2 Significantly, all of those actions are
dependent on a public official bringing suit.
Although forcing compliance may be difficult, many federal privacy
statutes-especially those that apply to government release of infor-
mation-nonetheless enhance accountability by imposing documentation
and public-reporting rules. Most classically, Title III imposes a raft of re-
198. Of course, there is much academic debate regarding the actual effectiveness of
exclusion, but in principle the doctrine provides both an incentive for law enforcement to
conform its behavior to the constitutional standard as well as a mechanism for law creation,
norm setting, and public transparency.
199. In other words, although a statute may provide an individual remedy for viola-
tions-in the form of damages or an injunction, say-a party cannot necessarily seek the kind
of structural reform necessary to ensure broad future compliance. Solove, supra note 35, at
1168-69. Many statutes do allow for equitable remedies, but that does not necessarily mean
that a court will use its power to order a fundamental reconfiguration of an institution's prac-
tices.
200. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public
Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IowA L. REV. 553, 595 (1995).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b).
202. 45 C.F.R. § 164.408(d) (2012) (HIPAA); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f) (2006) (FERPA); 42
U.S.C. § 14132(c) (2006) (DNA Act).
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porting requirements that generate detailed records of all wiretaps sought
and granted under its provisions.203 FERPA likewise requires that entities
record all requests for access, "indicat[ing] specifically the legitimate inter-
est that each ... has in obtaining the information, ' '204 and mandates the
creation of an office and review board within the Department of Education
for the purposes of investigating violations. 05 The IRS Code requires "com-
pliance with a comprehensive system of administrative safeguards and
record keeping requirements" that has "been strengthened over the years."2 6
The CMPPA compels regular congressional reports and creates a "Data In-
tegrity Board." 207 In contrast, recordkeeping requirements are less
commonly found in statutes that regulate disclosures made by private enti-
ties, such as the VPPA (video rental agencies), FCRA (credit agencies), or
COPPA (online service providers). 208
Notably, such requirements seem particularly susceptible to erosion:
several statutes initially contained strong reporting standards that were
subsequently reduced or eliminated. For instance, the Privacy Act initially
required biennial reports to Congress, but that requirement was effectively
repealed.20 9 Similarly, the RFPA initially ordered an annual report to Con-
gress documenting all applications for delay of notice filed by the
government and all customer challenges, as well as a report on government
requests for financial records, but that rule was repealed in 1992.210
In sum, whereas the imposition of accountability mechanisms like re-
porting requirements or oversight boards arguably achieves more protection
for privacy rights than imposition of an exclusionary rule, there remains
troubling inconsistency across statutes both with respect to imposing and
monitoring those standards. Even still, given the choice between relying on
the application of the exclusionary rule-which is notoriously unsatisfying
203. 18 U.S.C. § 2519. However, a wide array of experts have agreed that "Congress...
bungled even a relatively easy task-the creation and maintenance of a system for systematic
collection of telecommunications surveillance statistics." Schwartz, supra note 68, at 919.
204. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4).
205. Id. § 1232g(g).
206. Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV.
1065, 1095 (2003).
207. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(u), 552a(s) (2006).
208. Note that COPPA did require a five-year report to Congress. 15 U.S.C. § 6506
(2006).
209. Section 552a(s) contains the original provision, but this requirement "cease[d] to be
effective" on May 15, 2000. Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-66, § 3003(a)(1), 109 Stat. 707, 733, reprinted as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 1113 note at
197 (2006). Agencies still must submit reports under the Computer Matching and Privacy
Protection portion of the Privacy Act.
210. See 12 U.S.C. § 3421 (1988) (repealed 1995). Though the section was formally
repealed in 1995, Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 § 3001(d), 109 Stat. at
734, the reporting requirement had been eliminated in 1992. Federal Courts Administrative
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 502(a), 106 Stat. 4506, 4512.
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in that it rewards the criminal for the "constable's blunder"2 -and requir-
ing entities to generate data that would record and publicize the whole
breadth of police investigative activity, many privacy advocates would un-
doubtedly choose the latter.
I. Federal Privacy Statutes Tend to Set Floors, Rather than Ceilings
A common criticism of Fourth Amendment law is that it nationalized the
work of policing and prosecution, a historically state and even local affair.2 12
Congressional action, particularly in this political environment, likewise
raises questions about the proper extent of federal power. States have always
been and continue to be active regulators of personal privacy. As Paul
Schwartz observed, "[S]tates have often been the first to identify areas of
regulatory significance and to take action.' ' 2 13 Accordingly, this Section con-
siders the federalism question from three perspectives: (1) the degree to
which federal statutory privacy laws focus on traditionally federal concerns,
as opposed to areas of traditional state concern; (2) whether and under what
general conditions federal statutory privacy laws preempt their state coun-
terparts; and (3) whether and under what conditions federal laws appear to
influence or exert pressure on states to enact their own privacy provisions or
vice versa.
Assessing federalism interests is never a simple affair, but it is particu-
larly complicated with regard to criminal justice. There are multiple
variables that may be involved, including the nature of the requesting offi-
cial (federal or state), the nature of the authority under which a request is
made (for instance, the Pen Register Act allows state officials to use the fed-
eral law), the forum in which the request is litigated (federal or state courts),
and the scope of any exclusionary or evidentiary rules that might apply in
that forum. Suffice it to say that it is beyond the purview of this Article to
explore every permutation of these variables with regard to each statute, so
my goal in this Section is instead to draw broadly applicable conclusions
that might illuminate the federal question, albeit from afar.
First, federal privacy statutes extend beyond the conventional federal
domain. At one end of the continuum is a statute like the Privacy Act, which
applies only to federal agencies. Next along might be something like the
RFPA, which applies broadly to financial institutions, a typical federal con-
cern, and only restricts disclosures made to federal agencies and officials.2"4
Then might sit statutes such as ECPA, FCRA, and arguably even HIPAA,
211. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y 1926). It is also unsatisfying as of late as
the Supreme Court appears committed to dramatically curtailing its applicability. See, e.g.,
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
212. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
216-43 (2011).
213. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 917 (listing examples).
214. This limitation was specifically imposed in response to concerns by state and local
law enforcement agencies that a national privacy law would violate federalist principles and
unduly impede such agencies' efforts. Kirschner, supra note 59, at 27-28.
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which have strong state and local dimensions but speak so centrally to inter-
state commerce that even a parsimonious interpretation of federal power
would justify intervention.
But a handful of statutes cover issues typically entrusted entirely to
states or localities. FERPA addresses education; CCPA addresses the provi-
sion of cable services; the DPPA addresses driver's licenses; and VPPA
addresses video rentals. In the increasingly globalized village, each of these
areas obviously has the capacity to significantly impact interstate and even
international concerns. Nevertheless, they are also historically sites of
strictly local- or state-level control.2" 5 A parallel argument might be made of
statutes federally criminalizing privacy-intrusive behavior, such as the Video
Voyeurism Act.21 6 Of course, it bears admitting that Congress has also en-
acted privacy laws that indirectly protect states' rights: in order to prevent
the creation of centralized firearm registries, Congress passed a law prohib-
iting any rule or regulation that requires federally mandated firearms
licenses be maintained such that "any system of registration of firearms,
firearms owners, or firearms transactions or dispositions be established. 21 7
In fact, litigants have raised, and courts have largely rejected, federalism
complaints about privacy statutes. In Reno v. Condon, the Supreme Court
heard a challenge to the DPPA based on a claim that it exceeded the com-
merce power and violated the Tenth Amendment." s In its brief unanimous
opinion upholding the Act, the Court summarily rejected the State's argu-
ment, noting that the "DPPA regulates the States as the owners of data
bases," rather than commandeering employees or mandating passage of par-
ticular laws.219 If the DPPA offers any guidance, it seems that a significant
measure of federal privacy regulation of traditional state tasks can withstand
constitutional federalism challenges.
To the extent that Congress possesses and has used relatively broad
power to regulate privacy, it then remains to inquire into the relationship
between the substantive content of that regulation and the residual power
left to the states. Have federal privacy statutes on balance set floors for pri-
vacy upon which states are able to heap additional protections, or have they
established ceilings beyond which no additional safeguards may ascend? A
statute such as the RFPA provides a good illustration of the inherent
215. Cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating federal law that
"commandeered" state officers for background checks on firearm purchasers); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking federal act as violative of Tenth Amendment).
216. Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating provision of Vio-
lence Against Women Act of 1994 that provided civil remedy for violation as insufficiently
justified by Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as insufficiently justified under
Commerce Clause).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) (2006). See generally Elaine Vullmahn, Comment, Firearm
Transaction Disclosure in the Digital Age: Should the Government Know What Is in Your
Home?, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 497, 503 (2010).
218. 528 U.S. 141, 147-48 (2000).
219. Condon, 528 U.S. at 150-51.
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complexity of answering that question: the RFPA is limited to requests by
federal officials and allows states to impose more restrictive privacy practic-
es in some cases, 20 but it also contains provisions that preempt state laws
with regard to certain kinds of requests for information. 2
Nevertheless, some rough conclusions may be drawn. Federal privacy
enactments appear to have set baselines for protection that states can, and
have, enhanced with their own enactments. A wide range of statutes explicit-
ly contain provisions preempting state laws that lessen protection but
expressly permitting state laws exceeding federal standards. Such statutes
include the VPPA, 222 HIPAA, 2 3 the Wiretap Act,224 FERPA,2 25 CCPA, 26 and
GLB. 27 The SCA goes a step further, showing deference to state law by
requiring that court orders "not issue if prohibited by the law of such
State."228 In contrast, only two federal privacy statutes expressly preempt not
just directly conflicting state legislation but also any state legislation that
would exceed their scope. Specifically, the Fair and Accurate Credit Trans-
220. See, e.g., Foxworth v. Trustmark Nat'l Bank, 934 F Supp. 218, 223 (S.D. Miss.
1996) (remanding lawsuit based on state law claims back to state court and rejecting bank's
argument of preemption).
221. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (2006) (permitting institutions to report identifying
information for potential lawbreakers, "notwithstanding any constitution, law, or regulation of
any State or political subdivision thereof'); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 688 F Supp. 319, 320
(W.D. Tenn. 1988) (holding the Tennessee financial privacy statute invalid under the Suprema-
cy Clause to the extent that it conflicted with the provisions of the RFPA authorizing a grand
jury subpoena); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Conn. Sav. Bank), 481 F. Supp. 833, 834-35 (D.
Conn, 1979) (finding state law requiring notice preempted by RFPA). But see In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 41 F Supp. 2d 1026, 1035-37 (D. Alaska 1999) (reconciling federal and state law,
but noting remaining confusion since it would impose additional procedural burden on U.S.
Attorney to seek delay of notice in order to comply with state statute).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(f) (2006).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7 (2006); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264(c)(2), 110 Stat. 1936, 2033-34 (1996) (codified as note
to 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2006)) ("A regulation promulgated under paragraph (1) shall not
supersede a contrary provision of State law, if the provision of State law imposes require-
ments, standards, or implementation specifications that are more stringent than the
requirements, standards, or implementation specifications imposed under the regulation."); 45
C.F.R. § 160.203 (2012).
224. The Wiretap Act is commonly interpreted to preempt less protective state laws. See
Richard C. Turkington, Protection for Invasions of Conversational and Communication Priva-
cy by Electronic Surveillance in Family, Marriage, and Domestic Disputes Under Federal and
State Wiretap and Store Communications Acts and the Common Law Privacy Invasion Tort, 82
NEB. L. REV. 693, 704 (2004). Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., which reached the Su-
preme Court in relation to a Fourth Amendment claim, raised a claim of federal preemption of
state privacy laws in the district court. 445 E Supp. 2d 1116, 1137-38 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (find-
ing that SCA preempted state privacy claims), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 529 F.3d 892 (9th
Cir. 2008), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010).
225. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(i)(2) (2006) (regarding drug and alcohol disclosures).
226. 47 U.S.C. § 552(d) (2006).
227. 15 U.S.C. § 6807 (2006).
228. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006).
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actions Act amendments to the FCRA prohibit states from enacting laws
that would impose higher standards on consumer reporting agencies, 229 and
COPPA likewise requires that "[n]o State or local government may impose
any liability ... inconsistent with ... this section. '230 Perhaps tellingly,
those two statutes deal directly with national commercial interests-
precisely the situation in which uniform privacy standards have been
proposed as most desirable. 231
Naturally, the complete picture of preemption is far more complicated.
Although federal privacy statutes generally do not preempt more privacy-
protective state enactments, in reality they cast shadows-both formal and
informal-that are longer than may first appear. The partial-preemption pro-
visions of HIPAA have been criticized as "'vague and confusing,' 'abstruse
and unworkable,' and burdensome, with the potential to 'create a compli-
ance nightmare for which no obvious answers exist.' 232 A handful of
cases-including the high profile attempt by the Department of Justice to
obtain the medical records of women who received late-term abortions-
have squarely confronted the conflict between HIPAA's rather broad law
enforcement exemption and state confidentiality provisions, with mixed re-
suits. 23 3 FERPA has similarly received criticism for ostensibly setting a floor
for privacy but in effect opening a door for federal legislators to meddle in
classic state concerns. 234 Similar ambiguities arise with respect to Title III
and the SCA. For example, Title III clearly sets a federal floor for wiretaps,
229. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t.
230. Id. § 6502(d).
231. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 928-29 (describing "business coalition in favor of [an]
omnibus privacy bill" as strongly in favor of preemption); cf JR. DeShazo & Jody Freeman,
Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1499, 1500, 1504-05 (2007) (describing idea of "defensive preemption," where regulated
entities seek federal preemption when faced with alternative of chaotic state rules).
232. Grace Ko, Note, Partial Preemption Under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 497, 501 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Privacy
Standards: Issues in HHS' Proposed Rules on Confidentiality of Personal Health Information:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 106th Cong. (2000)
(statement of Janet Heinrich, Associate Director, Health Financing and Public Health Issues),
and Sarah Beatty Ratner, HIPAA's Preemption Provision Doomed Cooperative Federalism, 35
J. HEALTH L. 523, 524, 536 (2002)).
233. Compare Nw. Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (quashing
subpoena on ground of undue burden on hospital when weighed against patient privacy and
limited probative value, but otherwise finding Illinois patient privilege inapplicable in federal
question suits like the one at issue), with Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ.
8695(RCC), 2004 WL 555701, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2004) (finding that HIPAA did not
incorporate state privacy statute that was more stringent than federal standard and thus disclo-
sure of medical records was permitted under federal evidence rules, which do not require
compliance with state privacy law).
234. See e.g., Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 432 (2002)
(finding practice of peer grading not to violate FERPA and noting that to do so "would effect a
drastic alteration of the existing allocation of responsibilities between States and the National
Government in the operation of the Nation's schools"). See generally Margaret L. O'Donnell,
FERPA: Only a Piece of the Privacy Puzzle, 29 J.C. & U.L. 679, 680-85, 698-99 (2003).
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and thus preempts any conflicting inferior state law, but an argument can be
made that ECPA's provisions regarding stored communications (as opposed
to intercepted communications in transit) are not likewise preemptive. 235
Nonetheless, the ultimate conclusion of this Section-that federal statutory
privacy tends to lay floors rather than raise ceilings-seems sound.
As a final piece in the federalism picture, I want to say a word about the
influence that federal statutory privacy plays in prompting state regulation,
and vice versa. It is certainly true that states have often been the first movers
in enacting privacy protections, and that this movement has in turn prompt-
ed federal legislation. 23 6 From the breadth of provisions detailed above, it
also seems fair to conclude that Congress's broad Commerce Clause and
Spending Clause powers have allowed it to reach a wide range of interests,
and that to the extent that coverage exhibits gaps or holes, it is unlikely that
we can attribute most of them to a lack of perceived or actual power on the
part of federal regulators.237
At the same time, it is also true that in many cases, "states simply mimic
or expand upon existing federal regulation, and state regulation is largely
attributable to the momentum of federal regulation." '238 Of particular interest
to criminal justice, one researcher observes that states seem particularly re-
sponsive with regard to "quasi-constitutional provisions regulating official
conduct," whether in response to federal decisions that set floors (like Katz)
or that expose important gaps in constitutional protection (like United States
v. Miller, Smith v. Maryland, or Zurcher v. Stanford Daily).239
As it is difficult to assess whether state or federal legislators are more
inclined to act first and under what circumstances, it seems that for now the
best we can say is that the evidence is inconclusive. In other words, "[t]he
existence of substantial state regulation of information privacy does not con-
235, See Leonard Deutchman & Sean Morgan, The ECPA, ISPs & Obtaining E-mail: A
Primer for Local Prosecutors, AM. PROSECUTORS RES. INST., 6 (Jul. 2005),
http://www.ndaa.orglpdf/ecpa isps.obtaining-emailO5.pdf ("Because there is a difference
between the Fourth Amendment rights protected under Title III and the statutorily-created
rights found in the SCA provisions of the ECPA, and because the preemption language of
Section 2516 so clearly applies solely to Title Ill, it can be argued that federal law regarding
stored electronic communication (e-mail) does not preempt and control state law as does fed-
eral wiretap law.").
236. Patricia L. Bellia, Feature, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE
L.J. 868, 887-89 (2009).
237. Consider the RFPA, for instance. Although it only applies to requests by federal
officials, it does not seem to make that choice out of legal necessity given the broader reach of
companion statutes. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
238. Bellia, supra note 236, at 889.
239. Id.; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that there was no
protectable interest in the numbers keyed into a telephone); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978) (holding that the First Amendment press right did not block execution of a
warrant); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that financial records handed
over to a third-party financial institution receive no Fourth Amendment protection).
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firm that competitive federalism is thriving-nor does the fact that states are
often followers of federal action suggest that it is not."
240
J. Relative Flexibility of Statutory Enactments
The last observation about federal privacy law relates to its capacity to
adapt to changing circumstances. Examination of federal privacy law sug-
gests that while Congress does, in fact, undertake substantial revisions on
occasion, it has also shown reluctance, or inability, to keep up with the
times. Specifically, this Section shows that Congress has not always proven
adept at maintaining the currency of legal standards. As a result, the exist-
ence of individual privacy has occasionally hinged on arbitrary distinctions.
For example, important statutory distinctions in the ECPA have notoriously
been rendered obsolete with the passage of time, and other provisions may
turn on arbitrary considerations, such as whether a website is accessed
through an iPad or a desktop computer, whether a video recording has au-
dio, or whether a caller uses a cordless phone. 241
To the extent that statutes do maintain flexibility, such flexibility results
as often from careful (or fortuitous) drafting that allows for expansive judi-
cial interpretations as from subsequent amendment. For instance, because
the VPPA covers not just "prerecorded video cassette tapes" but also "simi-
lar audio visual materials," courts could readily interpret the statute to
include DVDs and other materials.242 In this respect, any flexibility in a stat-
utory enactment derives from common law principles of statutory
interpretation.
Nevertheless, Congress has shown an ability to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances. Amendments to FERPA addressed concerns about victim
access to law enforcement records held by educational institutions. The
CMPPA updated the Privacy Act to address the advent of technologies ca-
pable of mining data for information. The CCPA was amended when it
became clear that cable technology would be used not only to transmit pas-
sive images but also to provide internet and voice services. And financial
and health regulations have been amended to address the rise in electronic
data transfer and e-commerce.
In sum, although Congress has demonstrated some willingness to amend
and enact laws that reflect contemporaneous concerns, it has also demon-
strated a stubborn resistance or woeful incapacity to rectify obviously
flawed and outdated provisions. In addition, many of its most successful
statutes have endured largely because of vague terms that can be adapted by
240. Bellia, supra note 236, at 890.
241. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 40, at 257; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying
Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 2007, 2034 n.108 (2010) (amassing examples of "ECPA-
bashing").
242. "[I]n construing the scope of the Act, this Court must strive to protect this aspect of
an individual's right to privacy in the face of technological innovations that threaten this fun-
damental right." Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede, 936 F. Supp. 235, 239 (D.N.J. 1996).
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judicial officials to apply to changed circumstances, suggesting that courts
have their own adeptness in keeping up with the times.
In closing, a survey of federal privacy statutes reveals a range of in-
sights: they emerged in the late twentieth century; they are sectoral rather
than comprehensive in scope; they are largely motivated by technological
developments; they primarily protect the privacy of individuals, most espe-
cially those in the socioeconomic mainstream; they universally provide for
law enforcement access to covered material; law enforcement access typi-
cally departs from the warrant and probable cause default of the Fourth
Amendment, but often imposes additional standards such as the regulation
of use and not just acquisition or the requirement of prior notice; the statutes
strongly disfavor the exclusionary rule remedy and are more inclined to im-
pose private civil or public enforcement remedies along with criminal
penalties; many of those penalties, by law or in practice, are meaningful
only in the event of willful or deliberate breaches; the statutes occasionally,
but not uniformly, impose mechanisms for structural accountability or
transparency; they reflect no clear commitment to or against federalist prin-
ciples; and they are not immune to ossification. The next and final Part
attempts to use these observations as a means of shedding some light on the
debate between constitutional and legislative regulation of privacy in the
criminal justice system.
II. LESSONS
What do the foregoing observations tell us about privacy in the criminal
justice system? In particular, how might they inform our understandings
about the respective roles played by Congress and the courts in regulating
privacy? How might these revelations answer larger questions about the role
that each branch might play in regulating privacy? Two conclusions present
themselves. As Section II.A shows, these observations dispute a number of
popularly held ideas about the roles of each institution, even while confirm-
ing some intuitions as true. As Section II.B argues, the task of regulating
privacy in the twenty-first century may simply be so complex that neither
institution should claim exclusive control or even be preferred to take the
lead. Rather, an approach of collaborative constitutionality is necessary to
achieve optimal levels for protecting privacy.
A. Myths Dispelled
As Part I demonstrates, close review of privacy statutes both affirms and
disputes several long-standing intuitions about the relative role played by
each branch in regulating privacy in the criminal justice context. By way of
affirmation, three things are clear: First, Congress has in fact shown a spe-
cial affinity for addressing technology-based threats to privacy, while
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generally ignoring non-technology-based ones. Second, Congress has prov-
en more adept than the courts at implementing mechanisms for systemic
oversight of privacy practices, as well as for reform of noncompliant institu-
tions. And third, only courts have shown a strong preference for the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for law enforcement violations of privacy
rules; legislatures instead rely on a constellation of other tools for such con-
straints.2 4
3
At the same time, my survey reveals several important insights at odds
with conventional beliefs. First, in many respects, statutes turn out to protect
privacy rights more than the constitutional warrant and probable cause re-
quirement. For example, statutes might require advance notice, allowing the
individual the opportunity to seek counsel and initiate adversary proceed-
ings to determine disclosure. They can further amplify the proof standard
from general probable cause by requiring clear and convincing evidence,
tailored showings of relevance, or exhaustion of other methods. And statutes
can impose a wide array of restrictions on the use of lawfully obtained in-
formation, such as restricting its subsequent transfer or mandating its
destruction. In contrast, the Constitution, when applicable, tends at most to
regulate acquisition of information by imposing an ex parte warrant re-
quirement, based only on probable cause and with broad latitude for what
constitutes "particularity." Moreover, constitutional standards rarely reach
beyond the moment of acquisition; once law enforcement lawfully obtains
information, it is free to use that information however it should wish.
Second, it is not clear that the political processes do a better job than
courts of airing and weighing the concerns of all relevant constituencies.
Although in theory they might, in practice that rarely seems to be the case.
This may call into question two critical assumptions favoring legislative
supremacy made by Professor Kerr and others: that legislatures are better
poised to gather facts about new technologies, and that "privacy rules pre-
sent relatively few opportunities for rent-seeking" behavior by special
interest groups. 2 44 Part I suggests that law enforcement has a clear and con-
stant voice in the political process, whereas the interests of privacy tend to
be represented by groups interested less in privacy vis-a-vis policing (and
the poor that make up the vast majority of criminal defendants) than privacy
as experienced by the middle and upper classes.
In contrast, in a Fourth Amendment hearing, the government has a
strong voice and advocate in the form of the prosecution, but a specific de-
fendant must represent the privacy of the policed classes (often poorly, in
the sense of either the lawyer's capabilities or the ubiquity of that client's
interests). This is not to say that one institution has always done a better job
243. Of course, an empirical determination of which remedy is more effective is beyond
the scope of this Article.
244. Kerr, supra note 12, at 859, 866-69. Peter Swire, in a response to Professor Kerr's
argument, worries about the "[p]ublic-[c]hoice [a]dvantages of [Ilaw [e]nforcement [o]ver
[p]rivacy [p]roponents" and proffers the example of surveillance legislation in the wake of




than the other. Rather, it simply suggests that neither the Court nor Congress
at present seem particularly inclined toward protecting the privacy of socio-
economically vulnerable groups, and neither the Court nor Congress has
proven more or less willing to consider the needs of law enforcement.
As an added complication to this picture, it is important to note an
emerging corporate interest in the continual expansion of police investiga-
tive technologies. Most technological surveillance devices are developed,
marketed, and maintained by private sector industries, not nonprofit or gov-
ernment entities.245 Private, profit-motivated industries have strong financial
interests in expanding the use of GPS tracking devices,2 46 biometrics, and
other investigative tools for law enforcement purposes. Thus, contrary to the
notion that there are few rent-seeking actors in criminal justice, in fact there
are strongly motivated and highly organized interest groups to lobby for
rules that promote the purchase and use of their products. Of course, in
some cases, entities that operate technologies used by the mainstream popu-
lation may have an interest in protecting the rights of their consumers-thus
internet service providers may balk at disclosing information that their cus-
tomers would find invasive, or wireless providers may fight against intrusive
requests. Nevertheless, as Part I shows, legislators can easily minimize such
problems by providing legal safe harbors for compliance with requests, and
even by mandating nondisclosure ("gag orders") to ward off public relations
nightmares.
Third, despite claims to the contrary, constitutional standards are not
clearly more intricate, opaque, or inflexible than statutory standards. Stat-
utes have an equal if not greater capacity to be unclear, vague, and
convoluted. In other words, it may be just as hard for the officer on the beat
to know the intricacies of a statutory rule as those of a constitutional one.
Moreover, it is not the case that Congress regularly amends privacy statutes
as they become obsolete; provisions like ECPA or the VPPA are hardly cur-
rent, and have stayed relevant at best due to creative interpretation on the
part of judges. Similarly, the flexibility of common law adjudication means
that courts can in fact adapt constitutional rules over time rather easily as
circumstances change, and that courts do in fact adapt statutory rules if giv-
en proper latitude.
Finally, there are clearly some areas about which the evidence regarding
relative strengths is in equipoise. For instance, in opposition to those who
claim that constitutional rulings trammel the interests of states, it is not ob-
vious that statutory enactments are more likely to be respectful of federalist
principles. Many statutes actively preempt contradictory state laws, or set up
245. As I explain in a manuscript currently in progress, many contemporary tools of
criminal justice (such as DNA, drug analysis machines, and even computer software) rely
upon the development of materials and instruments by the private sector.
246. See generally Ian Herbert, Where Are We with Location Tracking: A Look at the
Current Technology and the Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY
J. CRIM. L. 442 (2011) (describing companies behind GPS tracking devices).
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such a confusing web of preemption that it requires judicial intervention to
elucidate the permissible bounds.
Nor is it evident that either institution can lay claim to a superior means
of enforcing its rules. The exclusionary rule, practiced almost exclusively by
the courts, obviously has a long and controversial history. And yet its con-
tinued endurance, even in the wake of recent erosion,247 speaks to the lack of
clearly suitable alternatives. To that extent, the statutory provisions that mir-
ror those alternatives-say, by providing for civil remedies or disciplinary
sanctions-arguably serve to deter lawless police action no more effectively.
However, it does seem that Congress alone has demonstrated a willing-
ness, even if imperfectly executed, to impose structural checks that do more
to deter violations ex ante than might ex post alternatives. Statutes like
FERPA or the DPPA that allow for interventions at the institutional level
may end up preventing larger numbers of inadvertent improper disclosures
than case-by-case adjudication (whether criminal or civil) ever could. And
mandating disclosure of police investigative activity may bring to light
abuses perpetrated against persons found to be innocent, something that cur-
rent Fourth Amendment doctrine wholly obscures, with its focus on an
exclusionary rule that by its nature brings to light only cases in which evi-
dence is in fact found during the search.
B. Rethinking the Processes of Privacy
What then does all this mean for the optimal allocation of power be-
tween these two branches in regulating privacy? The answer, of course, must
in large part turn on one's own preconceptions about the optimal degree of
privacy protection. However, it is not my intention to engage that debate
here or persuade any reader that my own privacy-protective inclinations rep-
resent the ideal.248 While acknowledging that the two have a relationship to
one another, my effort is focused more on enhancing the legal processes by
which privacy is defined in our society than on advancing a particular sub-
stantive agenda about what that privacy ultimately might be.
I argue in this Section that it is undesirable for either the Court or Con-
gress to assume sole or even primary responsibility for regulating privacy in
the twenty-first century. The task is simply too complex to leave to one or
the other: Congress has proven too reluctant to take the lead without
prompting (whether from the Court or from popular events), and the Court
has proven too hesitant to grant certiorari or to confront headlong cases rais-
ing technology-based questions. Instead, the ideal would be to draw on the
relative strengths of each institution to compensate for the other's weak-
nesses: courts can benefit from the democratic accessibility and credibility
247. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011); Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135 (2009).
248. In this respect, my focus on privacy is more as a nominal idea that is the product of
legal processes that shift and reconfigure over time-most particularly, as the previous Part
tells us, from an exclusively constitutional or judicial category to something in which legisla-
tive enactments also play a role-than as a substantive set of rules or restrictions.
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of legislatures, and legislators can benefit from the moral authority and insu-
lation from interest-group politics that judges enjoy. Building on the
literature on collaborative constitutionalism and interbranch dialogue, 49 I
propose that the branches should work cooperatively to define and protect
privacy as regards criminal justice interests. And though my proposition
applies most directly to intrusions enabled by new technologies, since that
appears to be the area where Congress has demonstrated the greatest will-
ingness to act, it could in theory apply more broadly to any of the interests
enveloped by the Fourth Amendment.
The history of criminal justice privacy already contains several examples
of one model of such collaboration. Perhaps most famously, the Berger and
Katz opinions, which respectively invalidated a New York wiretap law and
held wiretapping to be a constitutionally protected activity, exemplify a pro-
cess by which the Court declares that an investigative method implicates a
Fourth Amendment interest and then sketches the contours of a
constitutional statute regulating the activity.25 0 Erik Luna terms this process
"constitutional roadmapping," and uses examples such as Morales25 I and
Dickerson25 to explore its strengths and weaknesses. 3
But that approach, while arguably effective, teeters too closely to pater-
nalistic oversight of Congress by courts. Although it utilizes the strengths of
courts-to protect against a core infringement of rights and enforce proce-
dural floors-it dismisses the relative power of legislatures to offer more
249. Several models of such cooperative rule elaboration have been proposed over time.
See, e.g., I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 5 (1991); ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A
TIME (1999); Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REV. 113 (1921). This
approach perhaps draws most directly from Guido Calabresi's idea of the "second look," Gui-
DO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982), and Erik Luna's notion
of constitutional roadmaps, Erik Luna, Constitutional Road Maps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 1125 (2000). With specific respect to criminal justice, Peter Swire proposed a beefing
up of the expectation-of-privacy test, as well as a procedural test for high-tech surveillance.
Swire, supra note 16, at 924-30.
250. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-56 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 54-56 (1967). In contrast, opinions like Smith and Miller arguably rest on the other end of
the same continuum-they declare certain activity untouched by constitutional rules (pen
registers, bank records) and leave it to Congress to decide whether to act. Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976). The Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1980 perhaps offers an example of the principle at work, although in a
counterintuitive fashion, as there the legislature decided to enhance the threshold imposed by
the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (2006); see also text accompanying note
127.
251. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). Although Morales invalidated a
city anti-loitering ordinance, id. at 51-52, one concurrence signaled exactly how a constitu-
tional ordinance might be written, id. at 67-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
252. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (invalidating a statute intended to
override the ruling that created the Miranda warnings for suspects).
253. Luna, supra note 249, at 1127-28. Ultimately, Luna is "not convinced that constitu-
tional road maps are inevitably superior or inferior to other dialogic strategies, or that they
will, in fact, increase interbranch dialogue in particular cases." Id. at 1241.
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granulated responses to protect cherished rights. By essentially scripting a
constitutional rule, courts using this approach may simply dictate the terms
of the statute to Congress and strip the legislature of all incentive to look to
its own strengths, including its ability to set broad terms of compliance that
are more innovative than the customary expectations of courts, such as a
warrant, probable cause, or the exclusionary rule.
For this reason, a preferred template for the kind of constitutional col-
laboration that I am imagining might be found in more obscure cases such
as South Dakota v. Opperman54 or Florida v. Wells.25 In those cases, the
court addressed the constitutionality of a search conducted pursuant to the
so-called "inventory exception," and found that the police action was consti-
tutional if it had complied with a preestablished policy, but unconstitutional
if conducted ad hoc or with unconstrained discretion . 5 6 The precise terms of
the policy were less important than the existence of the policy and the fact
of its regularity. The critical fact was ex ante constraints on discretion, sug-
gesting that a degree of variation in search policies is not only permissible
but expected. Another provision of the Constitution models just such an ap-
proach: the Third Amendment states, "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house.. . but in a manner to be prescribed by law."'257 Such
language emphasizes that it is the principle of legality that controls constitu-
tionality.
Similarly, the Court might address Fourth Amendment questions with a
greater emphasis on procedural, rather than substantive, review. In recogniz-
ing constitutional interests, the Court would still assume an agenda- and
baseline-setting role.25 8 But rather than find that any police action that im-
plicates the Fourth Amendment automatically requires a warrant and
probable cause, the Court could rely on the "reasonableness" clause of the
Fourth Amendment and focus instead on the quality of safeguards aimed at
protecting the interest. Indeed, the substantive nature and scope of such
safeguards might vary dramatically, and yet the police action would remain
constitutional. Constitutional review would thus look more like a checklist
of components than the current alternatives: the rejection of any constitu-
tional interest resulting in a total lack of constitutional scrutiny; application
254. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
255. 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (invalidating under inventory-search exception a search in which
closed containers were opened because the jurisdiction lacked a policy concerning the opening
of containers).
256. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-5; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 374-76. This exception permits law
enforcement to conduct warrantless searches of impounded property for the purpose of taking
inventory. See id.
257. U.S. CoNsr. amend. HI (emphasis added). I am grateful to Peter Swire for this
observation.
258. Akin to Rick Hills's suggestion that state laws can prompt business interests to put
topics on the federal agenda because those interests seek federal preemption, Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2007), judicial rulings can similarly prompt law enforcement to
put topics on the federal agenda for the same reason.
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of one-size-fits-all, one-shot warrant and probable cause requirements; or ad
hoc formulations of "reasonableness" rules.
Significantly, Justice Sotomayor's visionary concurrence in United
States v. Jones took a step in this very direction. 259 Recognizing the chang-
ing nature of police information gathering, she suggested that the executive
branch might require "oversight from a coordinate branch," and intimated
that the Court should "cease[] to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for priva-
cy."260 Although she did not elaborate on what she considers to be the proper
role, if any, of courts in applying the Fourth Amendment to a new method
such as GPS testing, her comments leave room for the possibility that some-
thing other than conventional Fourth Amendment analysis might be
allowed.
261
To lay out with greater specificity just what such review would look like,
Professor Peter Swire and I recently drafted a proposal that envisions four
steps.262 First, the court would determine whether a constitutional interest
was at stake-in other words, whether a "Fourth Amendment moment" had
occurred. If such a moment were established, then the court would ask
whether there were any formal limits on the exercise of law enforcement
discretion. Here, we imagine the limits as either legislative- or executive-
branch policies, spelled out and formalized in advance, which would govern
the activity. If no such limits on discretion existed, then the intrusion would
be presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. If such stand-
ards did exist, however, the third step would be to review the reasonableness
of those standards. This scrutiny would be structural and systematic, with a
high degree of deference as explained in greater detail below. Finally, if the
standards were found to be reasonable, then the last step would be to deter-
mine whether the police action had complied with those standards. If so, the
activity would be deemed constitutional.
So how would procedural review unfold? The core tasks would be to en-
sure that there were such entities charged with outlining policies, that the
processes for devising them were known to the electorate, and that the ulti-
mate policies were not grossly unjust. Preference should be given to limits
elaborated legislatively, rather than through executive discretion, although
the latter should be met only with greater skepticism, not presumptive inva-
lidity. Moreover, because the pace of technological change may make it
difficult for legislatures to elaborate the substantive standards governing a
259. 132 S. Ct. 945, 954-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
260. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956-57.
261. Justice Alito's concurrence likewise suggested that legislative action might be de-
sirable; but whereas Justice Sotomayor's opinion broaches tantalizing ideas about new forms
of constitutional review, Justice Alito's opinion arguably suggests that in the future the Court
would willingly defer-perhaps even wholesale-to legislative enactments. Id. at 964 (Alito,
J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the absence of federal legislation regarding the use of
GPS trackers, and thus concluding that "[tihe best that we can do in this case is to apply exist-
ing Fourth Amendment doctrine").
262. Peter Swire & Erin Murphy, How to Address "Standardless Discretion" After
Jones, Soc. Sci. REs. NETWORK (June 4, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2122941.
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particular investigative method (for instance, which GPS tracking devices or
DNA loci should be used at a given time), such decisionmaking may be del-
egated to more responsive, but nonetheless accountable, administrative
bodies. Such entities would preferably maintain a neutral stance, with a bal-
anced composition of interests. Regardless, courts would be well situated to
review the regulatory output of such a body, as they have long played a role
in reviewing the procedural fairness and regularity of administrative entities
in other contexts.
Although it is impossible in the abstract to provide a list of necessary
standards, because they would inevitably change according to the nature of
the investigative technique at issue, policies should at minimum share two
basic features: they should contain terms that cabin police activity, and they
should provide mechanisms for transparency and accountability. Important-
ly, legislative and executive actors should retain flexibility in choosing how
to satisfy these two criteria. Oversight is not intended to place the court in
the position of routinely second-guessing the substantive legislative or ad-
ministrative judgments, nor is it intended to necessarily review the output of
those bodies.
Of course, the success of this proposed approach requires that the Su-
preme Court relax Fourth Amendment conventions beyond its preferences
for warrants, probable cause, and the exclusionary rule. Thus, no regulatory
constraints should be inherently off the table. For example, courts should
remain receptive to, and recognize as constitutionally legitimate, regulatory
terms like the one posited by Justice Alito in Jones, which suggested that the
substantive nature of the alleged offense might dictate the scope of permis-
sible police activity.26 3 More radically, the exclusionary sanction would no
longer constitute the sole or even primary permissible constitutional remedy
in the event of a violation. In lieu of excluding evidence, for instance, a stat-
ute might require strict recordkeeping of surveillance efforts along with
regular assessments of the success of those efforts, and it would be the
courts' job simply to ensure that both were actually taking place. Constitu-
tional review would, in the first order, entail an assessment of the
comprehensiveness of regulatory efforts to ensure compliance, and then an
evaluation of the degree to which they had been faithfully and meaningfully
implemented.
Thus, for example, consider a court confronted with law enforcement
engaging in location surveillance. Rather than undertake a substantive re-
view that asks what number of days of GPS monitoring are permissible, a
court would shift to a primarily procedural inquiry that asks whether a pre-
existing policy prescribed limits on the number of days that monitoring may
263. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("We also need not
consider whether prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investigations involving ex-
traordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected sphere of
privacy."). Justice Sotomayor also intimated that she would entertain such an exception. Id. at
955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, 'longer term
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.'"
(emphasis added) (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment))).
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take place. It would examine the processes that went into fixing and an-
nouncing such a standard, giving greatest credit for public, democratically
accountable decisionmaking. Similarly, courts would consider whether a
policy contains structural and individual incentives toward compliance, pro-
vides corrective mechanisms in the event of violation, and devises sufficient
gauges of efficacy and abuse prevention.
No single solution is required; instead a variety of approaches might be
constitutional. One statute might provide for periodic audits; another might
focus on strict recordkeeping and public disclosure; another might set up
post hoc grievance processes. The court's role would be to ensure the basic
effectiveness of the approach, not to impose one version of constitutionality
over another. Accordingly, bald assertions of 100-percent success or compli-
ance rates would fail to pass constitutional muster, but demonstration of a
functioning system to record, revise, and improve errors would pass consti-
tutional muster. Indeed, it would even allow a regime to be upheld as
constitutional notwithstanding failure in a specific case. Naturally, if review
of the metrics of a particular method were to indicate that the policy had
become abusive, it could on those terms be declared unconstitutional.
However imprecise a procedural approach to cabining police discretion
may be, its advantages remain manifold. First, this approach may empower
courts to be less parsimonious in their recognition of constitutional interests,
because the consequences of such recognition are less severe. At present,
acknowledging a Katz reasonable expectation of privacy ("REP") usually
translates to imposition of a warrant-and-probable cause standard and possi-
ble suppression of evidence. As a result, courts arguably are reluctant to
recognize a REP in a wide variety of cases and thereby impose such inflexi-
ble procedural standards on law enforcement investigations, particularly as
regards the dynamic possibilities for investigation presented by new tech-
nologies. If so, the Fourth Amendment may fail to serve its historical role as
a bulwark against state oppression simply because it is irrevocably hitched
to procedural requirements that end up bulldozing the field.
Freed from conventional constitutional expectations, courts may answer
the threshold question of the applicability of the Constitution with less trep-
idation. A REP could be identified, but rather than automatically triggering
an ill-fitting warrant and probable cause requirement for a particular law
enforcement activity, the response would be to evaluate existing restrictions
on the investigative method or to encourage adoption of new standards.
That brings us to the second benefit of this approach, which is that it
creates an incentive for legislative and executive actors to formulate investi-
gative policies in the abstract. Such ex ante consideration is superior to the
present custom of post hoc adjudication of discretionary police deci-
sionmaking, often by applying a variable "reasonableness" analysis. It
would hopefully foster legislative creativity in addressing the scope of law
enforcement power, with the recognition that prospective rules will apply to
any potential target. Indeed, by forcing choices upstream from the moment
of investigation, rather than with the hindsight of the officer with the crimi-
nal in hand, this approach may ultimately enhance rather than diminish
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individual privacy rights. Moreover, as the lessons of the preceding Part tell
us, legislative solutions can offer not only structural checks that prevent un-
necessary intrusion but also incentives to correct institutional flaws that
arise. They can do more work in regulating the transfer and use of infor-
mation, rather than just its simple acquisition. There are even reasons to
think that notice-based subpoena requirements might do a better job at
safeguarding individual interests-because they allow for adversarial
process-than the "neutral magistrates" that issue warrants. And, to the ex-
tent that the lack of a uniform federal standard may result in confusion or
unappealing jurisdictional variation,"6 the counterargument may be that
permitting such variation as the social, legal, and cultural significance of a
new technology is slowly being established will provide the ultimate "labor-
atories for experimentation" that federal constitutional pronouncements
have long been criticized as stifling.
Third, this approach would allow for constraints on police activity better
suited to the realities of modem existence. As Justice Alito acknowledged in
his concurrence in Jones, "In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections
of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical." '265 Re-
source constraints operated silently in the background of every contested
case-simply by engaging in an investigative activity, law enforcement at
some level was expressing a belief in its utility and ranking its priority rela-
tive to other possible courses of action. But such calculations are absent
from the digital field; it is only through explicit articulation of the scope of
permissible law enforcement activity that priorities and commitments are
likely to be expressed (much less followed).
To be sure, abandoning the tripod of warrants, probable cause, and ex-
clusion that has long served as the foundation for the Fourth Amendment
carries with it many risks. There is a legitimate concern that legislative or
executive actors would simply craft vague, self-dealing policies. Alternative-
ly, policies may be clear but may also lead to standards far below what has
long been considered the barest constitutional threshold-say, by allowing
ex parte, unilateral "domestic security letters" compelling the disclosure of
sensitive information. Some may also argue that a deferential procedural
approach is likely to leave certain populations underprotected, particularly
since the population at large has shown little solicitude for criminal justice
targets in the past decades (consider punitive enactments such as three-
strikes laws, mandatory minimums, and so on).
These concerns are valid, but I would respond that, as the previous Part
lamentably acknowledges, such underprotection is arguably already a hall-
mark of criminal procedure jurisprudence. In this respect, simply
264. Precisely the complaint, it should be noted, that Justice Alito's concurrence made of
Justice Scalia's plurality determination to use state-based common law to define the scope of
constitutional protection in Jones. 132 S. Ct. at 961-62 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
265. Id. at 963; accord id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the cheapness
and surreptitiousness of GPS monitoring allows it to "evade[] the ordinary checks that con-
strain abusive law enforcement practices: 'limited police resources and community hostility.'"
(quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004))).
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demanding, as a constitutional matter, a public legislative and administrative
framework for intrusive policing methods of this kind may nonetheless mark
an advance over the current approach. Moreover, while such scenarios are a
risk, two realities offset my concerns. First, although imperfect, the demo-
cratic processes that have propelled enactment of statutory protections
across the range of areas that are currently unregulated by the Constitution
suggest that, for whatever reason, some momentum in favor of privacy ex-
ists among the polity. Thus, wholesale elimination of all safeguards seems
unlikely. Privacy from technological intrusions may also resonate more
broadly across the electorate, who may worry about their cell phones or in-
ternet searches, as opposed to privacy pertaining to topics applicable
primarily to specific socioeconomic groups (like privacy in welfare bene-
fits).
Second, in advocating for an approach to constitutional adjudication that
is heavily procedural, I do not mean to suggest that the courts would forfeit
all power to invalidate any particular police action. In addition to holding
unconstitutional wholly uncabined discretion, courts could still exercise
substantive review power in extreme cases. Giving courts the authority to
invalidate an act runs the risk of frustrating congressional attempts to define
the scope of protection, turning judicial review into a game of "guess what
I'm thinking." Thus, I intend for invalidation to occur only in the extreme
cases, but it will still be available as a last resort.
Admittedly, articulating the precise scope of this "last resort" core of
constitutional protection is inherently difficult, but it is not impossible. For
instance, invalidation would be appropriate if the regulatory protections
were so threadbare as to render the right essentially meaningless. Thus, a
"domestic security letter" standard, with no other procedural safeguards
(such as notice or use restrictions) and minimal incentives for structural
compliance or corrective reforms, might simply be deemed to offend the
baseline "reasonableness" standard to obtain highly sensitive material, such
as mental health records. At the same time, that low procedural threshold
might be supported if other strong safeguards were in place to prevent and
compensate for abuse, or if the information were deemed less intimate (say,
car rental history). Conversely, a right may be so inviolable that even elabo-
rate safeguards could not overcome it. In other words, the courts might still
hold it unconstitutional to order an individual to undergo a "mind-reading"
MRI, no matter how many procedural hoops law enforcement officers were
required to jump through.
In sum, allowing courts to invoke the Fourth Amendment as a way of
forcing the legislative agenda-thereby compensating for political process
flaws that might otherwise permit Congress to leave such areas unattend-
ed-while not tying legislative hands with constitutional thread might in the
long run offer a better balance between absolute-rights protectiveness and
unnecessarily rigid constitutionalism. This process-oriented approach would
use judicial review to sharpen legislative processes and improve policing
outcomes, while also maintaining the essential rights-defining and values-
protecting role of the courts.
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CONCLUSION
Whatever one's view of this proposal, one thing is clear. The nature of
privacy is changing in our society, as are the legal frameworks that govern it.
Criminal justice investigations are no longer largely governed by the Fourth
Amendment; instead, an array of generally applicable privacy statutes con-
trol access to many of the most important kinds of information available
about an individual. The time has come to pay greater attention to these
statutes-and in particular to their law enforcement exemptions-and to



































Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1951
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 1001
Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6502
DNA Identification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14131
Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721
E-Government Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3541
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 USC § 2000ff
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6807
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1181
Internal Revenue Service Code (Tax Reform Act of 1976), 26 U.S.C.
§ 6103
National Crime Prevention and Privacy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14616
Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a
Real ID Act, 17 U.S.C. 1027 and 49 U.S.C. § 30301
Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3408
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703
Taxpayer Browsing Act, § 26 U.S.C. 7213A
Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1039
Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710
Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1801
Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act, 47 U.S.C. § 615
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